The Jihadi Terrain in Pakistan: An Introduction to the Sunni Jihadi Groups in Pakistan and Kashmir

Dear Friends

Below is a research paper on Pakistan and Kashmir which will provide you a in depth knowledge about Pakistan based Militant groups and their functioning.

RDS

Pakistan Security Research Unit (PSRU)
Research Report 1
The Jihadi Terrain in Pakistan: An Introduction to the Sunni Jihadi Groups in Pakistan and Kashmir
Nicholas Howenstein
5th February 2008

About the Pakistan Security Research Unit (PSRU)

The Pakistan Security Research Unit (PSRU) was established in the Department of Peace Studies at the University of Bradford, UK, in March 2007. It serves as an independent portal and neutral platform for interdisciplinary research on all aspects of Pakistani security, dealing with Pakistan's impact on regional and global security, internal security issues within Pakistan, and the interplay of the two. PSRU provides information about, and critical analysis of, Pakistani security with particular emphasis on extremism/terrorism, nuclear weapons issues, and the internal stability and cohesion of the state. PSRU is intended as a resource for anyone interested in the security of Pakistan and provides:
•
Briefing papers;
•
Reports;
•
Datasets;
•
Consultancy;
•
Academic, institutional and media links;
•
An open space for those working for positive change in Pakistan and for those currently without a voice.
PSRU welcomes collaboration from individuals, groups and organisations, which share our broad objectives. Please contact us at psru@bradford.ac.uk We welcome you to look at the website available through: http://spaces.brad.ac.uk:8080/display/ssispsru/Home
Other PSRU Publications
The following papers are freely available through the Pakistan Security Research Unit (PSRU):
•
PSRU Report number 1. The Jihadi Terrain in Pakistan: An Introduction to the Sunni Jihadi Groups in Pakistan and Kashmir
•
Brief number 20. The India-Pakistan Peace Process: Overcoming the 'Trust Deficit'
•
Brief number 21. Pakistan's Political Process
•
Brief number 22. The Security of Nuclear Weapons in Pakistan
•
Brief number 23. Militancy in the FATA and the NWFP
•
Brief number 24. The Gathering Strength of Taliban and Tribal Militants in Pakistan
•
Brief number 25. Swat: A Dangerous Flashpoint in the Making
•
Brief number 26. Nuclearization and the External Dimensions of South Asian Strategic Stability
•
Brief number 27. Are Pakistan’s Nuclear Warheads Safe?
•
Brief number 28. The ISI and the War on Terrorism
All these papers are freely available from: http://spaces.brad.ac.uk:8080/display/ssispsru/Home
2
TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY...............................................................................................4
ABOUT THE AUTHOR...................................................................................................5
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS..............................................................................................5
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND TERMS..................................................................6
THE JIHADI TERRAIN IN PAKISTANF.....................................................................7
TOWARD ISLAMISM.....................................................................................................9
FROM SECULARISM TO ISLAMISM IN KASHMIR.............................................11
THE JIHADI GROUPS..................................................................................................12
Jamaat-e-Islami (JI)...................................................................................................13
Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM).........................................................................................14
Ahle Hadith Groups....................................................................................................17
Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT)...............................................................................................18
Deobandi Groups........................................................................................................22
Harkat-ul-Jihad-i-Islami (HuJI).................................................................................23
Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM)....................................................................................25
Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM).........................................................................................28
Jamaat-ul-Furqan.......................................................................................................31
Sipah-e-Sahaba (SSP)................................................................................................32
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ)............................................................................................35
AN EVOLVING JIHAD?...............................................................................................37
3
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
After the U.S.-led coalition ousted the Pakistan-allied Taliban the spotlight was once again on mujahideen in Pakistan. By this time, however, anti-American, anti-Jewish, and anti-Hindu ideologies were already common narratives among these groups, despite operations remaining regionally focused. It does appear that the message of jihad is becoming increasingly transnational for some of these groups, but reports that conflate them with the broader global Salafi jihad seem oversimplified.
This is certainly not to downplay the danger that these groups pose to human security and overall stability in the region. Their goals, organizational structures, and demographics differ in several ways from the global Salafi jihad, but they are no less lethal in their mission. The ability of these groups to incite Islamic fervor against India and the West and in the name of Kashmir has left a bloody trail, and their ability to cleave sectarian rifts in Pakistan has taken a massive toll on the country’s society and national identity. Their availability as a cheap and able proxy against India has helped keep the Pakistani military a state within a state. Aside from their role in broader Islamist militancy, these groups are entrenched as obstacles to security and state-building in Pakistan.
Three basic groupings of jihadi organizations operate within Pakistan and Kashmir corresponding to the three major Sunni ideological paths that they follow: those groups under the umbrella of Jamaat-e-Islami, those following the Deobandi school, and those following the Wahhabi / Ahle Hadith interpretation of Islam. While these distinctions may appear trivial to an outsider, they certainly matter to the members involved.
Many of these groups are highly organized along the lines of standing armies or even corporations. However, internecine fighting is also a characteristic that has caused many of these groups to fracture. This is in large part due to the many personal alliances and friendships born during the Afghan jihad against the Soviets. Once the focus turned toward the U.S. and its Pakistani regime allies, many of the larger-than-life personalities that head these groups began to compete over tactics and resources.
Potential members are often attracted to a group based on its unique sectarian or ideological bent. Thus, individuals inclined toward the Deobandi interpretation will join Harkat-ul-Mujahideen or Jaish-e-Mohammed, while those who follow the Ahle Hadith ideology will join Lashkar-e-Taiba. The charisma of individual leaders or the reputation of specific groups can also play an important role in attracting members. Many Pakistan watchers also believe that groups attract recruits through active proselytizing. Lashkar-e-Taiba, for example, will often not discriminate and will use Ahle Hadith indoctrination to attract both Deobandi and Barelvi recruits.
Although many of the militant groups operating in Pakistan and Kashmir seem to share very similar ideological underpinnings, the differences between the various schools of Islam—in their origins as well as their politics and their attitudes toward minorities—are crucial. Groups aligned with a given school will recruit members from particular mosques and train them at camps with a specific ideology. Much of the tactical training is necessarily similar due to common battle environments, and during periods of alliance some groups will allow others to use their training camps.
4
According to many South Asia experts, mapping and understanding the webs, networks, and unintended consequences of these militant groups is a “house of horrors.” Even their interlocutors in the Pakistani security services often have trouble controlling them. This has become clearer with the multiple assassination attempts on President Musharraf and other top government officials. Moreover, the complicity of some lower-level military personnel is a major concern. As many younger officers and soldiers populate the security services, generational differences in ideology begin to appear, and the investigations from the assassination attacks have revealed that enemies of the government are dangerously close. This is also ostensibly happening within the jihadi groups, particularly within splinter groups who are frustrated with the perceived moderation of their parent organizations and who have become even more radical. Further alliance building and the forming of “hit squads” appear to be a result of this radicalization.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Nicholas Howenstein is a Senior Program Assistant in the Center for Conflict Analysis and Prevention at the U.S. Institute of Peace. His primary areas of interest are Islamist militancy, political violence and radicalization, failed states, and the drivers of conflict. He received his B.A. from James Madison University in Harrisonburg, Va., and his M.A. from the Elliott School of International Affairs at the George Washington University in Washington, D.C.
Nicholas Howenstein
Center for Conflict Analysis and Prevention U.S. Institute of Peace
1200 17th Street, NW,
Suite 200 Washington, DC 20036
(v) 202.429.1982
(f) 202.833.1757
Email: nhowenstein@usip.org
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The author would like to acknowledge Chris Fair, Praveen Swami, and the U.S. Institute of Peace for their comments and support.
5
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND TERMS
Ameer title of respect or nobility, usually meaning “commander”
dawa invitation to Islam
HM Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (Organization of the Mujahideen)
HuA Harkat-ul-Ansar (Movement of the Helpers of Mohammed)
HuJI Harkat-ul-Jihad-i-Islami (Movement of Islamic Jihad)
HuM Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (Movement of Holy Warriors)
HuMA Harkat-ul-Mujahideen-al-Alami (Movement of Holy Warriors—International)
ISI Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (Pakistan intelligence service)
JeM Jaish-e-Mohammed (Army of Mohammed)
JI Jamaat-e-Islami (Islamic Party)
JKLF Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front
JuD Jamaat-ul-Dawa (Group of the Call to Islam)
JUI Jamaat-ul-Ulema-i-Islami (Assembly of Islamic Clergy)
LeJ Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (Army of Jhangvi)
LeT Lashkar-e-Taiba (Army of the Pure)
LoC Line of Control (between Indian- and Pakistan-administered Kashmir)
madaris plural of madrassa (religious school)
mujahideen holy warriors (singular: mujahid)
NWFP Northwest Frontier Province (of Pakistan)
RAW Research and Analysis Wing (branch of the Indian intelligence service)
shahid a mujahid who has been martyred
SSP Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan
tabligh to convey the message of Islam
tawhid the unity and sanctity of God (Allah); rejection of idolatry
TJ Tablighi Jamaat (Conveying Group)
UJC United Jihad Council
Umma community of believers
6
THE JIHADI TERRAIN IN PAKISTAN1
Nicholas Howenstein
For the second time in three decades, the top priorities for American foreign policy have put Pakistan in the spotlight. Much to the chagrin of jihadi groups operating in Pakistan, the spotlight is also on them. Once the beneficiaries of U.S. and anti-Soviet aid, these jihadi groups are currently enduring scrutiny from the West, as well as the ire of President Pervez Musharraf. Due to the Pakistan government’s choice of “moderated jihad” strategy, which has involved tighter sanctions on Islamist groups operating in Pakistan and in Jammu and Kashmir, several of these groups continue to be the prime culprits in many antigovernment attacks.2 While groups operating under Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) have seemingly followed Musharraf’s demands, those of the Deobandi school of Islam are in fact connected to several assassination attempts on senior Pakistani officials. Therefore, while the United States has focused attention on such groups because they ostensibly occupy the same milieu as al Qaeda and the global Salafi jihad, the government of Pakistan is aware of the peculiarities of these groups. Most of these groups are not Salafi and hold beliefs inextricably linked to Islam’s evolution in South Asia. That notwithstanding, these groups are far from innocuous, and their proliferation “is the direct result of the jehadi culture prevailing in the country.”3
Not all these groups are directly associated with al Qaeda, but because of the complex relationships fostered during the period of Soviet occupation from 1979 to 1989, or the “Afghan jihad,” it is difficult to state definitively that any of them are immune from its influence. Those that are linked to al Qaeda rely mainly on relationships between individuals, dating back to the Afghan jihad, rather than on any overlapping organizational structure. Authorities have reportedly captured or killed top al Qaeda officials in or around facilities associated with groups such as Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), Lashkar-e-Taiba, and Jamaat-i-Islami. Beyond this scattershot of loose affiliations, however, the strength and influence of these ties is speculative at best. However, the investigation into the assassination of former prime minister Benazir Bhutto has led some to claim that local militants are now allied with al Qaeda in significant ways that are shaping the new face of these groups and the security situation in Pakistan.4
1 Note: Claims by jihadi leaders and excerpts from publications used by these groups are generally avoided as sources of factual information. Where I do incorporate these claims, I try to note that they are from just one source in the mix of competing, and often dubious, reports. It is beyond the purview of this study to assess their veracity. Also, this paper uses consistent spellings of group names and leaders. For example, Lashkar-e-Taiba is so named in this work, though it may appear as “Lashkar-e-Toiba” or “Lashkar-e-Tayyiba” in other sources or translations. Also, while many of the groups have emerged under new names following government bans, I continue to use the original names, which are often still widely associated with the groups.
2 See Peter Chalk and C. Christine Fair, “The Re-Orientation of Kashmiri Extremism: A Threat to Regional and International Security,” Terrorism Monitor 3, no. 22 (November 17, 2005), http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2369833.
3 Muhammad Amir Rana, A to Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan, trans. Saba Ansari (Lahore: Mashal Books, 2004), 83.
4 Carlotta Gall, “Local Militants in Pakistan Add to Qaeda Threat,” New York Times, December 30, 2007, A1, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/30/world/asia/30pakistan.html.
7
After the U.S.-led coalition ousted the Pakistan-allied Taliban from Afghanistan, several Pakistani jihadi groups adopted a decidedly anti-Western ideology. Anti-American, anti-Jewish, and anti-Hindu ideologies were already common even before September 11, 2001, but the operational focus of these groups has remained regional. So, while the post-September 11 worldview brought these groups into focus for many—avid South Asia watchers aside—conflating them with al Qaeda and its ilk is in ways reductionist and oversimplified.
This is certainly not to downplay the danger that these groups pose to human security and overall stability in the region. Their goals, organizational structures, and demographics differ in several ways from the global Salafi jihad, but they are no less lethal in their mission. The ability of these groups to incite Islamic fervor against India and the West and in the name of Kashmir has left a bloody trail, and their ability to cleave sectarian rifts in Pakistan has taken a massive toll on the country’s society and national identity. Their availability as a cheap and able proxy against India has helped keep the Pakistani military a state within a state. These groups are entrenched as obstacles to security and state-building in Pakistan.
While many of these groups use twenty-first-century technology (e.g., cell phones and the Internet) to plan and execute operations, and several have adopted the strategy of dispersed nodes acting independently, they can also be highly organized. Several groups, especially Jaish-e-Mohammed, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM), are structured as an amalgam of professional armies and corporations. Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, considered one of the best-organized jihadi groups operating in Kashmir, is organized along standing battalion and company formations. However, while highly organized, another interesting characteristic of these groups is their fractious nature. Many jihadi groups were born of the Afghan jihad, with allies in that war coalescing to form new groups once Kashmir became the primary focus. This, however, strained competing allegiances and threatened some of the larger-than-life personalities that head these groups. One may notice the tendency of groups to ally based on convenience, only to split over tactical differences and skirmishes over resources.
Jihadi groups based in Kashmir operate, although only nominally, under the United Jihad Council (UJC). The Council is headed by the leader of Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, Mohammed Yusuf Shah, who is more commonly known by his nom de guerre, Syed Salahuddin. However, many of the groups under the Council’s umbrella follow their own strategies and fight among and within themselves for resources and the patronage of the Pakistani government, namely, the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI). In fact, the ISI is involved in many of the splits among the Deobandi and Jamaat-e-Islami-influenced groups. Conversely, Lashkar-e-Taiba has not yet encountered this problem, furthering the belief among analysts that it remains the chosen group of the Pakistani government. One primary reason for the ISI to orchestrate these rifts is its belief in a divide-and-manage strategy to keep these groups under control by shifting its support to leaders willing to work closely with the government. In many ways, an examination of jihadi groups in Pakistan and Kashmir requires as much study of the individual agents who guide them as of the goals and ideologies of the groups and their patrons.
8
Toward Islamism
While South Asian Islam has historically been steeped in the syncretism of Sufi Islam, several schools, some dating back to British rule in India, have co-opted Islamic rhetoric in a revivalist tradition. With the inclusion of India into the British Empire, Muslim influence in South Asia declined dramatically. These revivalist movements arose in order to protect the interests of Indian Muslims and to reassert Islamic identity. Sayyid Ahmed of Bareili (from which the Barelvi strain of Hanafi Islam takes its name), who was greatly influenced by the teachings of Muhammad ibn-Abdul Wahhab,5 started the first of these groups in the nineteenth century. Sayyid Ahmed’s revivalist ideas became the mold for Islamist groups in South and Central Asia. This, however, does not fully explain the rise of militant jihadi groups in the region.6
South Asian scholar Saeed Shafqat, currently of Columbia University, believes the rise of religiopolitical groups and their militant offshoots in Pakistan has roots in the country’s shift away from a position of official Islam toward one of Islamism, beginning in the 1970s. In other words, Islam in many ways became a movement. These groups are of “association, solidarity and belief” and transcend traditional boundaries of ethnicity, also playing on the ideological and cultural ties of their members. First, they present Islam as the “panacea for all ills” and view the state as a vehicle for imposing Islamic tradition and law. These groups then must also forge an identity counter to the “other.” Where they find adversity in existential threats by the West or by Hindus, they are also proponents of a “Pakistani ideology.” That Pakistani national identity and militant Islamic ideology have in some ways dovetailed, especially in the past three decades, has also made these groups champions of jihad in Kashmir and Afghanistan and on other fronts where Islam is ostensibly under attack.7
One of the places where these jihadi groups now see Islam under attack is in Pakistan itself. In the past, Kashmir-focused groups tended to confine their operations to India and Indian-administered Kashmir, and sectarian groups attacked communal rivals. However, the distinctions between groups have recently become less clear-cut, with overlapping membership and conflated goals. One of the most prevalent examples of this is Jaish-e-Mohammed’s links to attacks on the Musharraf government.8 Indian journalist Praveen Swami also sees “considerable continuities of thought and action which cut across organizations—and, at once, profound contradictions.”9 In fact, the dynamics of militancy in Jammu and Kashmir go far beyond the confines of that particular conflict and have more origins in nationhood and religious identities throughout South Asia. While the distinctions between these groups are discussed below, their similarities in goals and strategies often go unnoticed.
5 Wahhab, an eighteenth-century Islamic scholar, inspired the “Wahhabist,” movement, which believes in the purification of Islam through an embrace of tawhid and other practices as they were in the time of the prophet Mohammed.
6 Husain Haqqani, “The Ideologies of South Asian Jihadi Groups,” Current Trends in Islamist Ideology 3, (February 16, 2006),12-13.
7 Saeed Shafqat, “From Official Islam to Islamisim: The Rise of Dawat-ul-Irshad and Lashkar-e-Taiba,” in Pakistan: Nationalism without a Nation? ed. Christophe Jaffrelot (London: Zed Books, 2002), 132-33.
8 Swami, “Terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir in Theory and Practice,” India Review 2, no. 3 (July 2003): 56.
9 C. Christine Fair, “Militant Recruitment in Pakistan: Implications for Al Qaeda and Other Organizations,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 27 (2004): 491.
9
Though one recent poll has shown the Pakistanis believe the militant groups to be a threat to Pakistani security,10 the climate within the country portends continued support from the intelligence services in the near future. There is little evidence that Pakistan has made a strategic move away from relying on militant groups to prosecute its foreign policies toward Kashmir, India, and Afghanistan, but the government has circumscribed (at least temporarily) the ability of some groups to act openly as it increasingly becomes their target. Before the November 3, 2007, state-of-emergency declaration, the Musharraf government was engaged in a balancing act that tried to keep international (namely, U.S. and Indian) condemnation at bay while trying to minimize any internal unrest. Nonetheless, a general backlash against the United States for its foreign policy decisions and its encroachment on Pakistani sovereign territory (in the frontier provinces) and against the Musharraf government for its complicity have all fueled the fire of jihadi groups.11 The military’s inadequate initial response to the October 2005 earthquake also did much to rally support for militant groups operating in Kashmir and the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP). While the military maintained austere control of the situation, effectively locking civilian institutions out of the humanitarian relief efforts, the jihadi groups were in many cases the first and only groups to provide assistance. The military itself waited nearly three weeks to begin providing shelter, food, and other provisions. Despite this abysmal response—and despite the clear availability of civilian relief organizations and NGOs—the military still held tightly to its central role even after months of reconstruction efforts.12 Militant groups quickly filled this space and provided the much-needed services and aid. This left many of the victims to question the willingness and ability of the military and the government to provide for them.13
As Swami writes, mapping and understanding the webs, networks, and unintended consequences of militancy is a “house of horrors.”14 Even the masterminds and handlers in the Pakistani security services often have trouble reeling these groups in, as evinced by the assassination attempts on Musharraf in late 2003 and the recent assassination of Benazir Bhutto. Moreover, the complicity of some lower-level military personnel is a major concern. The manner of the attacks, whose planning would have involved intimate knowledge of Musharraf’s closely held itinerary, pointed to involvement by officials working in the president’s security detail.15 In fact, many believe that some of the jihadi groups, particularly splinter groups who have scoffed at the perceived moderation of their parent organizations, have become even more radical. It is believed that the same umbrella group masterminded the attacks against Musharraf on December 14 and 25, 2003, but intentionally kept the individual attack cells sequestered from each other. During the trial of the planners of the December 25 suicide attack, it was believed that “some misguided Islamic warriors and a bunch of low ranking army and air force personnel” launched the plots.16 Rogue jihadists and rank-and-file military personnel may have been the foot soldiers in these attempts on Musharraf’s life, but such dismissive accounts belie some of the reports that followed the investigations. Purportedly, important figures linked to Harkat-ul-Jihad-i-Islami
10 See C. Christine Fair, Clay Ramsay, and Steve Kull, Pakistani Public Opinion on Democracy, Islamist Militancy, and Relations with the U.S. (January 7, 2008), 12-15. http://www.worldpublicopinion.org.
11 C. Christine Fair, “Militant Recruitment in Pakistan: Implications for Al Qaeda and Other Organizations,” 493.
12 International Crisis Group, “Pakistan: Political Impact of the Earthquake,” Asia Briefing no. 46 (March 15, 2006).
13 Gary Thomas, “Earthquake Galvanizes Pakistani Islamists,” VOA News (November 2, 2005).
14 Swami, “Terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir,” 55.
15 Amir Mir, “Target Musharraf,” The Herald Annual (Pakistan), January 2004, 39.
16 Quoted in Zaffar Abbas, “What Happened?” The Herald (Pakistan), June 2005, 71.
10
(HuJI), Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM), Jaish-e-Mohammed, and al Qaeda organized a meeting in October 2001 that was attended by members of the security services, to plan jihad against American allies, including Musharraf. Among the leaders were Amjad Farooqi, who died in a shootout with authorities in September 2004; Omar Saeed Sheikh, who was sentenced to death for his role in the murder of American journalist Daniel Pearl; and Abu Faraj al-Libbi, who was arrested in May 2005 for planning attacks against Musharraf and former prime minister Shaukat Aziz. In all, at least six foiled or failed attempts on Musharraf’s life sprang from the meeting of these individuals.17 The evidence was mounting that some militants were focusing jihad on their former allies in the government.
From Secularism to Islamism in Kashmir
The insurgency in Kashmir began on March 31, 1988, when the pro-independence Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) formally launched its campaign against the Indian government. Although it had prior ties to Jamaat-e-Islami, JKLF’s objectives were relatively secular. However, as the attention of the Pakistani security services shifted away from the western front, and mujahideen became increasingly motivated by their victory in Afghanistan, the secular dimensions of the struggle fell into the shadows. By the beginning of the 1990s, radical Islamist groups used their ties to the ISI and the military to supplant the secular rhetoric of the pro-independence movement with Pakistani nationalism and, above all, the symbols of jihad.18 Although some of these jihadi groups can trace their roots back to the beginning of the Afghan campaign and perhaps even further, this shift, which can be marked by the rise in attacks in 1989 and 1990, is a sufficient launching point for an introduction to these groups.
Since the mid-1990s, Indian officials have claimed a dramatic rise in the number of militants crossing the Line of Control (LoC) from Pakistan-administered Kashmir—an increase that they attribute to a large infusion of Pakistani or “foreign” cadres. However, by some accounts the numbers do not coincide with the identifications of killed or captured militants. The greatly inflated numbers of “foreigners” that groups claim to command are either errors in identification (any unidentified militants are almost automatically categorized as Pakistani) or a propaganda tool to show the solidarity of the Kashmiri jihad, or both. Whatever the actual numbers may be, they remain estimates and are hard to pinpoint. Indian security forces estimate the number of militants operating on both sides of the LoC to be 3,500. The composition of the jihadi groups ranges from three-quarters Kashmiri, in groups such as Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, to about three-quarters Pakistani, in groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed.19 It is these largely Pakistani groups that seem to be most hostile to any sort of negotiated settlement with Indian security forces. Groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, and Jaish-e-Mohammed largely outnumber Hizb-ul-Mujahideen and have rejected any attempts at a cease-fire with Indian forces.20 In the past, some groups have hinted at the possibility of a cease-fire, but hard-liners in the respective groups have quashed these attempts. On at least two occasions,
17 For an account of these meetings and the chronology of assassination attempts, see Abbas, “What Happened?” 70-75.
18 Alexander Evans, “The Kashmir Insurgency: As Bad as It Gets,” Small Wars and Insurgencies 11, no. 1 (Spring 2000): 69.
19 Swami, “Terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir,” 65.
20 Ibid., 65. 11
Hizb-ul-Mujahideen has extended a cease-fire proposal to the Indian government, only to rescind the offer, sometimes just days later. In July 2000, Abdul Majeed Dar, then chief commander of the group’s operations in Jammu and Kashmir, proposed a cease-fire that was initially endorsed by its leader, Syed Salahuddin. However, Salahuddin later withdrew his support, effectively taking the cease-fire off the table and ultimately precipitating a split in Hizb-ul-Mujahideen.21 In November 2006, Hizb-ul-Mujahideen again hinted at a “winter truce” with the Indian government, but again the proposal was withdrawn. In this case it is believed that hard-liners in the United Jihad Council, of which Hizb-ul-Mujahideen is the largest component, pressured that group’s leadership to pull back on the offer because it conceded many of the preconditions for settlement that the Council’s members demanded of India.22
By 2000, Alexander Evans states, politics in Indian-administered Kashmir had “become largely meaningless,” and the government’s failure to provide autonomy or jobs at the time “made it extremely unpopular with ordinary Kashmiris.” Therefore, not only did the militant groups receive a great deal of support from the Pakistani regime, but they also enjoyed popular support from Kashmiris who were frustrated and disillusioned by a failing government.23 The Pakistani media continues to report the popularity of these groups within Pakistan security services despite the bans of such affiliations.24
The Jihadi Groups
Pakistanis often join a group based on its unique sectarian or ideological bent. Thus, individuals inclined toward the Deobandi interpretation will join Harkat-ul-Mujahideen or Jaish-e-Mohammed, while those who follow the Ahle Hadith ideology will join Lashkar-e-Taiba. The charisma of individual leaders or the reputation of specific groups can also play an important role in attracting members. Many Pakistan watchers also believe that groups attract recruits through active proselytizing. For instance, as Christine Fair notes, Lashkar-e-Taiba often will not discriminate and will use indoctrination to attract both Deobandi and Barelvi recruits, the first phase of its training being to teach the Ahle Hadith tradition.25
According to the research of Amir Rana, training is similar across many jihadi groups, and it typically takes eighteen months for mujahideen to become fully functional.26 There are six stages to jihad training before a mujahid is deployed. The first stage, Tasis, is the indoctrination period, during which no military skills are taught. This is a period in which religious and sectarian fervor is instilled in the trainee, and the phase generally lasts one month. For example, Lashkar-e-Taiba will use this stage to convert recruits to Alhe Hadith teachings. Next is Al Ra’ad, a three-month period that continues the indoctrination period but also includes the
21 See the South Asia Terrorism Portal entry on Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/terrorist_outfits/hizbul_mujahideen.htm. See also Amir Rana, A to Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan, 452-53.
22 Praveen Swami, “United Jihad Council Backs Down on Ceasefire Offer,” The Hindu, December 1, 2006, www.hinduonnet.com/2006/12/01/stories/2006120103211200.htm.
23 Evans, “The Kashmir Insurgency,” 73-78.
24 Swami, “Terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir,” 71.
25 Fair, “Militant Recruitment in Pakistan,” 493.
26 Amir Rana, A to Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan, 115-16.
12
stock of their recruits and administer mental and physical tests to make sure the recruit is fit for a life of jihad.
After these four months of spiritual conditioning and an introduction to light military activities, a six-month period of guerrilla training begins. Upon completion of this phase, mujahideen can technically be put in the field, but only after writing their will and giving it over to the ameer (a title of respect or nobility, usually meaning “commander”) of the camp. However, should the trainee require more specialized instruction, he will be sent on to Doshka and Jandla. The seven- to ten-day Doshka training teaches the recruit to use handheld weapons. Not all mujahideen go through the nine-month Jandla phase, which is considered the most difficult. During this training the mujahid learns how to use automatic arms and to craft explosives. Thus far, only the facilities linked to Lashkar-e-Taiba, Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, and Harkat-ul-Jihad-i-Islami have the resources to conduct this training, but other groups often use these facilities to train their own mujahideen. The final two stages often depend on resources and the necessity of certain operations. For example, only the leadership of a jihadi group engages in Domela training, which teaches the handling of shoulder-fired weapons. Zakazak is also a rare form of training, because it involves familiarization with tanks, canons, and other heavy weaponry, to which many groups do not have access.27
Three basic groupings of jihadi organizations operate within Pakistan and Kashmir corresponding to the three major Sunni ideological paths that they follow: those groups under the umbrella of Jamaat-e-Islami, those following the Deobandi school, and those following the Wahhabi / Ahle Hadith interpretation of Islam. While these distinctions may appear trivial to an outsider, they certainly matter to the members involved. Still, this taxonomy does not preclude groups of different sectarian affiliations working together for operational or tactical purposes.
Jamaat-e-Islami (JI)
Founded in 1941 by Maulana Abul Ala Maududi, Jamaat-e-Islami is connected to the kindred Muslim Brotherhood in the Middle East. Maududi began with the principle that the primary struggle in the world was between Islam and unbelievers and that Islam was essential to any proper political system. He advocated what he termed a “theo-democracy,” under which officials are elected, though they are ultimately subservient to divine law as interpreted by learned Islamic scholars.28 Initially, Maududi set out steps for the ascension of the Islamic state: using alliances with other Islamic parties from around the world, creating a robust social welfare network, which gained popular appeal, and establishing a network of schools. The strategy was based on the belief that society and state institutions must first be tempered before JI could condition the vanguard for the gradual but complete infusion of Islam into the state.
Jamaat-e-Islami enjoys the support of a diverse cross section of Pakistani society, including students, unions, and professional organizations. However, its strongest ties are to the political elite, and it remains a focal point in the debate over Islam’s role in Pakistani politics and national identity. When General Zia-ul-Haq made Islamism an official state policy after seizing power in 1977, JI benefited as the regime’s ideological arm. This afforded JI members access to the upper
27 Ibid., 115-16.
28 Haqqani, “The Ideologies of South Asian Jihadi Groups,” 15-16. 13
echelons of the regime. For Zia, JI’s presence in the administration satisfied both the pious middle class, who saw its own fate locked to that of the party, and the Islamist intelligentsia, who followed the teachings of Maududi.29 Although the Pakistani branch of JI has embraced politics, it fared poorly after the death of General Zia and the ascent of Benazir Bhutto’s Movement for the Restoration of Democracy. JI’s political fortunes remained modest for much of two decades as it lost its stronghold in Karachi during the 1980s, won only a handful seats as part of a coalition in 1993, and boycotted the 1997 elections outright. When the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal coalition gained victory in Baluchistan and the Northwest Frontier Province in 2002, JI apparently regained its role as one of the most influential Islamist lobby in Pakistan.30
Along with its political ups and downs, Jamaat-e-Islami has also been linked to militancy. Its Razakar fighters made their foray into violent jihad in the 1971 Bangladesh war for independence. This incursion forged JI’s ties with the Pakistani security services, including the ISI, and later with the Zia-ul-Haq regime, as these Razakar members were recognized as official members of the Pakistan army. This acceptance later grew into JI’s overt support for Afghan mujahideen, to whom it supplied training and funds raised from wealthy Arab and local patrons. This alliance of JI and the Afghan mujahideen thrived and also included a vast network of madaris (plural of “madrassa”), businesses, and charities. In turn, JI greatly influenced these Afghan mujahideen, including those led by Gulbeddin Hekmatyar and Burhanuddin Rabbani, who began to adopt the group’s anti-Western rhetoric.31 After Soviet troops withdrew from Afghanistan, JI turned its attention to Jammu and Kashmir, with the continued support of the ISI. Jamaat-e-Islami, however, wanted to maintain its distance from direct militant activities, identifying itself as more of a political-ideological movement and adopting a cautious, gradual approach to jihad. A leading scholar of JI, Professor Khurshid Ahmad, has pulled no punches in offering ideological justification for militant jihad in Afghanistan and Kashmir as well as against the West. In order to distance itself, JI has established groups dedicated solely to jihad, the most prominent of which is Hizb-ul-Mujahideen.32
Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM)
Master Ahsan Dar, a former schoolteacher and trained Kashmiri fighter, formed Hizb-ul-Mujahideen in October 1989. The group is credited with shifting the Kashmir issue away from a nationalist struggle, toward a broader campaign to unite Kashmir with Pakistan. Although some of its cadres support independence for Kashmir, HM gets much of its funding and ideological underpinnings from Jamaat-e-Islami. HM adopted a constitution in 1990, which established a Majlis-e-Shura (later replaced by a Supreme Council), a chief patron, an ameer, and a commander in chief, who, in consultation with one another as well as with JI, appoint the leadership of HM.33 HM’s affiliation with JI allowed HM militants to train in Afghan camps run by Gulbeddin Hekmatyar until the Taliban seized power. Currently led by Syed Salahuddin, HM mainly comprises ethnic Kashmiris, but Pakistanis of non-Kashmiri origin, affiliated with
29 Gilles Kepel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 100-104.
30 International Crisis Group, Pakistan: The Mullahs and the Military, ICG Asia Report no. 49 (March 20, 2003), 6.
31 Haqqani, “The Ideologies of South Asian Jihadi Groups,” 18.
32 Ibid.
33 See Amir Rana, A to Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan, 438. Amir Mir explains the group’s leadership a bit differently, claiming that “a 20-member Council and a five-member Shura run the party.” See Amir Mir, The True Face of Jehadis (Lahore: Mashal Books, 2004), 129. 14
Jamaat-e-Islami, are also in its ranks. It is headquartered in Muzaffarabad, in Pakistan-administered Kashmir, and its size has been estimated at anywhere from several hundred to tens of thousands of members. There is great disparity in the numbers given by several different sources. U.S. government reports have tended to underestimate HM’s ranks (at several hundred to 1,000), and another report estimates HM’s cadre strength at only 1,500. On the other hand, HM itself claims numbers that far eclipse both estimates. Amir Rana writes that in 2001 HM’s yearly report claimed to have nearly 2,500 active mujahideen and almost 13,000 total mujahideen. And Amir Mir reports HM’s ranks to number as high as 20,000.34
Recent reports however tell of a crisis for recruitment and morale in HM. The number of cadres available at its main training camps has dwindled to a little over six hundred, and the spigot for arms and materiel has run nearly dry.35 Though its popular support has decreased as of late, it recruits many of its members from Kashmir so HM remains one of the most influential groups in the region. While it does have a cadre of Pakistani volunteers, it is widely considered the most ethnically Kashmiri of the militant organizations. HM has established a network with operations in Pakistan-administered and Indian-administered Kashmir and in Pakistan. Pakistani officials believe that HM controls up to 60 percent of the mujahideen operating in Kashmir, perhaps because of one report that HM has been working alongside Lashkar-e-Taiba since 1997. Because of its ethnically Kashmiri cadres, HM often works alongside other militant groups to provide local knowledge to the overwhelmingly Pakistani and foreign membership of other groups.36
In its mission to unite Jammu and Kashmir entirely with Pakistan, HM primarily targets Indian security forces and politicians in Kashmir.37 Hizb-ul-Mujahideen is very well organized militarily, and, as mentioned above, it is modeled after a highly structured army. The Central Command Council is headed by the commander in chief, and there are three to four “battalions” in each district. HM even has platoons and companies named after Companions of the Prophet and other venerated figures.38 HM’s attacks have been some of the most troublesome and lethal for Indian forces and installations. It is one of the only militant groups to assassinate high-ranking Indian personnel, including three major generals and several hundred officers of all ranks. It has crippled Indian army communications infrastructure and has conducted daring raids, jailbreaks, and ambushes. HM has purportedly even carried out attacks within India, detonating bombs near the Ministry of Defense and the army headquarters, and conducting a raid with grenades and small arms near an office of the Indian Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) in New Delhi.39 HM recruits many of its cadres using JI institutions to conduct these operations. It uses the subgroups Islami Jamiat-e-Tulaba and Jamiat-e-Tulaba-e-Arabia to recruit students from universities and JI-affiliated madaris. Jamaat-e-Islami also plays a key role in raising funds for
34 For more on these competing claims, see South Asia Terrorism Portal, Group Profile, www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/terrorist_outfits/hizbul_mujahideen.htm (accessed November 1, 2006); Amir Rana, A to Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan, 447; and U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2005, 241.
35 Praveen Swami, “Between the Hammer and the Anvil,” The Hindu (India), May 3, 2007, www.southasianmedia.net/index_opinion4.cfm?id=114887.
36 This is, however, the only report of HM and LeT working in tandem. See MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base at www.tkb.org/Group.jsp?groupID=52 .
37 Evans, “The Kashmir Insurgency,” 70; and U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2005, 241.
38 Amir Rana, A to Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan, 441.
39 For more on these operations, see Amir Rana, A to Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan, 443-45.
15
HM. In addition to donation boxes, which are set up throughout Pakistan and Kashmir, JI has also set up at least five different foundations, domestic and international, to fund the jihadi cause and aid the families of fallen mujahideen.40
Despite its prominence, internecine squabbles have struck HM and given rise to a number of splinter groups. The first of these breakaway groups, Jamiat-ul-Mujaheddin, formed in 1990. According to Amir Rana, HM is actually an amalgam of several groups that were operating in Kashmir before 1989: the Zia Tigers, Al Hamza, Maudodi Squad, Ansar-ul-Islam, Tehreek-e-Jehad-e-Islami, the Allah Tigers, and Al Badr.41 Hizb-ul-Mujahideen was originally named Al Badr for a very short time, and another splinter group of HM would also go on to adopt this name.42 In fact, several groups have used the name Al Badr, from the 1971 war, in which Bangladesh won its independence, up to the present. The current incarnation of Al Badr split from HM in 1998. Once active on the Afghan front, Al Badr turned its attention to Kashmir, where it remains active. Unlike its parent organization, it is made up mostly of Pakistanis, along with a few Afghans and Kashmiris.43 Hizb-e-Islami and Lashkar-e-Islam are two other offshoots of Hizb-ul-Mujahideen.
Many of these splits have occurred over tactical disagreements and personal differences. It is also believed that the ISI orchestrates the mergers and rifts—in HM and in other groups as well—as a divide-and-control strategy. As mentioned above, one key internal rift arose when Syed Salahuddin expelled Abdul Majeed Dar, a popular leader among cadres, from the group. Majeed Dar, a field commander and second in command of HM, announced a cease-fire with Indian troops in July 2000—a precarious situation that the group was forced to accept when Salahuddin endorsed the offer. The cease-fire was eventually rescinded under pressure from HM’s more hard-line allies. Majeed Dar was ousted, and subsequent clashes between supporters of the two leaders ultimately ended in a formal split. Majeed Dar was murdered at his home in March 2003, and Salahuddin’s faction is still regarded as the main bloc within HM and remains at the helm of the Muttahida Jihad Council.44
The rifts in HM occurred primarily because of the group’s origins as a conglomeration of several Kashmiri militant outfits. There are also three separate factions of HM based on regional distinctions: India-administered Kashmir, Pakistan-administered Kashmir, and Pakistan. Syed Salahuddin continues to lead the Pakistan group. By 1997, disagreements over the direction of the jihad in Kashmir incited Syed Salahuddin’s HM unit to split from JI. In his announcement, Syed Salahuddin claimed that his faction was now the fighting force of all people in Kashmir because JI was too busy playing politics. This reportedly upset the ISI, and talk of Syed Salahuddin’s ouster began to surface. This in turn sparked a feud between Syed Salahuddin’s unit and Masood Sarfraz’s Pakistan HM division. Amir Mir writes that for a time, the ISI had designated Masood Sarfraz to replace Syed Salahuddin. In October 2000, however, JI leadership expelled Masood Sarfraz over allegations of resource embezzlement and mismanagement. Angered by this, Masood Sarfraz formed the splinter group Hizb-e-Islami. Made up primarily of
40 Ibid., . 448-49.
41 Ibid., . 438.
42 Swami, “Terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir,” 58, table 1.
43 Zaffar Abbas, “The Militant Brigade,” The Herald (Pakistan), February 2004, 59.
44 Ibid., 55-56.
16
Kashmiris from Pakistan-administered Kashmir, its ranks also contain Pakistanis and, more recently, the Majeed Dar faction of HM.45 Another HM commander split and formed Lashkar-e-Islam after the aforementioned cease-fire row.46 These groups, however, are small and only able to conduct more narrowly focused and less lethal attacks.
In 2003, tensions also began to mount between HM and JI over impending talks between the All Parties Hurriyat Conference and the Indian government. While pro-Pakistan Islamist leaders in HM attempted to rally support, JI chiefs wanted to stay out of the imbroglio between centrists and hard-liners. Islamist members within JI increasingly found themselves marginalized as JI leaders began to view HM as a liability to its overall mission. The removal of hard-line leaders from the All Parties Hurriyat Conference evinced a deep and seemingly irrevocable rift between centrists and Islamists. However, centrists were soon defeated as support for Islamist leaders grew and the overtures made by moderates were met with violence and a string of terrorist attacks. Islamists and unionist movements are finding increased support in Jammu and Kashmir, while support for HM is waning. Should cadres and funding continue to dwindle, HM may find itself in need of JI’s tutelage once again.47 If anything, these splits are testimony to the volatility of many jihadi groups, for even apparently stable groups can fracture over personal disagreements.
Ahle Hadith Groups
As one of the most puritanical strains of South Asian Islam, Ahle Hadith is closely linked with Wahhabism of the Arabian Peninsula. Brought to India in the late nineteenth century, the Ahle Hadith tradition sought to change the landscape of Islam in South Asia by reasserting the Quran and the Hadith as the only supreme authorities in Islam. In the syncretism already present in South Asia, especially Sufism, Ahle Hadith founders saw polytheistic and thus impure influences in the form of superstitions, ceremonies, temple and saint worship, and the adoption of some Hindu and Buddhist rituals. The Ahle Hadith sought to reaffirm tawhid (unity of Allah; monotheism) and reject all but the purest forms of Islamic teachings. The number of its adherents has historically been low due to early confrontations with generations-old traditions in South Asian Islam. Nonetheless, its followers are among the most fervent, and it enjoys the largess of wealthy regional and Saudi patrons. It has recently gained popularity, especially after these groups were better able to organize after the Afghan war and after many Pakistanis working in the Gulf region returned home with Wahhabist beliefs.48
45 Mir, The True Face of Jehadis, 127.
46 Abbas, “The Militant Brigade,” 59.
47 See Praveen Swami, “Jamaat-e-Islami takes On Hizb,” The Hindu (India), January 9, 2004, www.thehindu.com/2004/01/09/stories/2004010904591100.htm and ; Swami, “Between the Hammer and the Anvil.”
48 Haqqani, “The Ideologies of South Asian Jihadi Groups,” 24. See also Husain Haqqani, “India’s Islamist Groups,” Current Trends in Islamist Ideology 3 (February 16, 2006): 21-22; and ; Bashir Amad Khan, “The Ahl-i-Hadith: A Socio-Religious Reform Movement in Kashmir,” Muslim World 90, nos. 1-2 (Spring 2000): 133-58.
17
Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT)
Lashkar-e-Taiba was founded in the Kunar province of Afghanistan, and it is the most prominent Ahle Hadith group operating in Pakistan and Kashmir. It is the militant wing of a large religious organization, Markaz Dawa-ul-Irshad, which was formed in the mid- to late 1980s by Hafiz Muhammad Saeed, Zafar Iqbal, and Abdullah Azzam.49 The Pakistani government formally banned the group and froze its assets during a crackdown in January 2002.50 The Markaz runs a large, self-sufficient complex at its headquarters in Punjab, near Lahore, and most of its members are Punjabi. The Markaz also runs an extensive network of madaris and ostensibly legitimate businesses. While it receives much of its funding and resources from Pakistani patrons, it casts its ideological net much wider. Besides fighting to bring Kashmir into the fold of pristine Ahle Hadith Islam, LeT also wants to unite the entire Muslim community of South Asia and beyond.
As an offshoot of the Markaz, LeT initiated militant activities in Jammu and Kashmir in the early 1990s, distancing itself from the rifts that arose between mujahideen in Afghanistan. At that time, it linked up with the group Islami Inqilabi Mahaz51 to infiltrate the LoC.52 LeT is made up of several thousand members from Pakistan and Pakistan-administered and Indian-administered Kashmir, and veterans of the Afghan war.53 The group also claims to have members from seventeen different countries, including Algeria, Sudan, Yemen, Iran, Chechnya, the United States, and the UK. According to associates close to Hafiz Muhammad Saeed, LeT has stockpiled enough arms and ammunition in the Kashmir valley to fight the Indian army for at least six months. LeT claims the largest militant network in Pakistan by maintaining 2,200 offices nationwide and some two dozen camps to launch fighters across the LoC, though it also claims to have decreased the number of its camps under post-September 11 scrutiny.54
Using Quranic verse as justification, Lashkar’s rhetoric deems jihad, whenever and wherever Islam is under attack, to be a religious obligation for all Muslims. In the book Hum Jihad kyun Kar rahe hain? (Why Are We Waging Jihad?), the group declares that the United States, India,
49 There seem to be conflicting accounts of when the Markaz Dawa-ul-Irshad was founded. The MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base puts its founding in 1989, whereas Saeed Shafqat puts it in 1987. Amir Rana also gives a conflicting date, 1986, and Amir Mir, in The True Face of Jehadis, writes that LeT was also founded in 1986, as an original component of the Markaz.
50 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2005, 207.
51 Very little is known about the structure and ideology of Islami Inqilabi Mahaz. The group claimed responsibility for the murder of four Americans and their Pakistani liaison in Karachi in 1997. However, shadow and obfuscation surround the group and its origins, especially following its claim to have detonated a series of bombs in New Delhi in October 2005. Some analysts believe that Islami Inqilabi Mahaz is simply another name used by LeT to evade scrutiny. See the group profile at the MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base at www.tkb.org/Group.jsp?groupID=4613. Also see “Inqilabi just another name for LeT,” Times of India, October 30, 2005, www1.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/1280239.cms. See also Randeep Ramesh, “Police Arrest 20 in Search for New Delhi Bombers,” The Guardian, October 31, 2005, www.guardian.co.uk/kashmir/Story/0,,1605167,00.html.
52 Swami, “Terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir,” 58, table 1. While Swami puts the origin of LeT in 1990, there is disagreement her as well. Amir Mir states that the group was formed in 1986 alongside its parent group, whereas Shafqat puts the rise of both groups one year later, in 1987. There are also conflicting dates for LeT’s first attack in Kashmir. Amir Rana puts its first attack in January 1990, with the murder of five members of the Indian air force as they waited at a bus stop in Rowalpura. See Amir Rana, A to Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan, 329. However, the South Asia Terrorism Portal agrees with Swami that LeT’s first attack in Kashmir was not until 1993.
53 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2005, 208.
54 Abbas, “The Militant Brigade,” 61. For a similar account, see Mir, The True Face of Jehadis, 96.
18
and Israel are existential threats to Islam. Much of the group’s literature and teachings justify a nearly perpetual state of jihad and interpret all Muslim territory as subject to Muslim re-conquest in the broadest terms.55 Jihad also includes the right to avenge the loss of any land once under Muslim rule, including countries such as Spain. Therefore, Hafiz Saeed not only wants to unite Kashmir with Pakistan, but he also wants to see Pakistan become part of a “global Islamic state.”56
After its reported involvement in a spate of attacks, LeT has been touted as the leading—and the most dangerous—militant jihadi group operating within Pakistan and Kashmir57. It has been implicated in an attack on the Srinigar airport that killed five, an attack on a Srinigar police station that killed eight, and an attack against Indian border forces that killed at least four. It also claimed responsibility for an attack on the Indian army base in Kaluchak that killed thirty-six. Moreover, it is one of the primary groups, along with Jaish-e-Mohammed, suspected in the December 2001 attack on the Indian parliament. In March 2002, senior al Qaeda member Abu Zubaydah was apprehended at a house in Faisalabad belonging to an LeT member. LeT has also claimed responsibility for the December 2000 attack on the Red Fort in New Dehli, which would substantiate the group’s claims that it has extended its operations inside India and Indian-administered Kashmir.58 However, LeT may be in the midst of a shift in tactics. Rather than sending forward large companies of up to sixty militants to confront Indian security forces, the group has opted for smaller cells of five to fifteen mujahideen,59 perhaps to make operations less conspicuous and more in line with Musharraf’s “moderated jihad” strategy.
Although accounts of the LeT training regimen differ, scholars and analysts agree that the training yields well-planned and well-executed attacks. According to Saeed Shafqat, training in LeT takes place in two stages, with trainers divided into specialists and ordinary trainers. Some reports also note a distinction in trainees, between militants and ulema (religious scholars).60 There is also some disagreement over the indoctrination that members receive before the first stage of training. Amir Rana states that, as expected, many LeT trainees come from the traditionally South Asian schools of Islam (Deobandi, Hanafi, and Barelvi). Therefore, the Markaz teaches them Ahle Hadith principles in two separate courses, Dora A’ama and Dora Khasa. The former is a twenty-one-day course in which the Ahle Hadith creed is taught, and the latter is a three-month period during which Ahle Hadith is taught as the supreme form of Islam.61 This differs a bit from Shafqat’s statement that a fifteen-day dawa tour in the broader community precedes military training. Three months after this initial tour, each trainee is evaluated.62 The first stage of training then begins, lasting for twenty-one days. After another
55 Haqqani, “The Ideologies of South Asian Jihadi Groups,” 25.
56 Mir, The True Face of Jehadis, 110.
57 Evans, “The Kashmir Insurgency,” 71.
58 Abbas, “The Militant Brigade,” 61.
59 Mir, The True Face of Jehadis, 96.
60 See the South Asia Terrorism Portal profile for Lashkar-e-Taiba at www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/terrorist_outfits/lashkar_e_toiba.htm.
61 Amir Rana, A to Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan, 335.
62 The South Asia Terrorism Portal also mentions the Dora A’ama and the Dora Khasa, but it does not specify whether these are religious indoctrination courses or part of the military training. The Portal also states that the first phase of training is a two-month course on the handling of small arms, rocket launchers, and grenades. See www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/terrorist_outfits/lashkar_e_toiba.htm.
19
evaluation period, the second stage begins, teaching combat tactics such as operating bombs and rockets, conditioning for marches over treacherous terrain, and general guerrilla tac63
The extent of LeT assets is not fully known, but the group receives donations from the Pakistani diaspora community of the Gulf States and the UK. It also receives financial support from Muslim NGOs and businesspeople from Pakistan and Kashmir. Donation boxes have also reappeared in public spaces and outside mosques (following an absence after other militant groups were banned), but the lion’s share of funds still comes from large donations by wealthy patrons. Markaz leaders are also reportedly making numerous property investments throughout the country.64 The group maintains extensive ties to groups throughout the Muslim world, including Chechnya, the Philippines, and the Middle East. These ties are maintained through the Markaz, but LeT also disseminates its message and calls for donations through its Web site Jamaat-ud-Daawa. Like many banned militant groups, LeT has also removed most of its assets from its previous bank accounts and invested in legal enterprises.65 The group focuses most of its recruiting and propaganda efforts on rural areas.66 However, it is also known to distribute propaganda and recruitment materials, such as its Jehad Times, the speeches of Abdullah Azzam, and pamphlets on the virtues of jihad around the world, outside mosques and even at Tablighi Jamaat’s annual ijtima in Raiwind.67 The Markaz also publishes an Urdu-language magazine, Aldawa, which has a reported circulation of 80,000.68
The Markaz Dawa-ul-Irshad has a largely self-sufficient, heavily guarded compound covering nearly two hundred acres, situated on the Grand Trunk Road at Murdike, in the Punjab province of Pakistan.69 The compound has been declared an Islamic state, banning music, television, and smoking. It is from this fortress that the Markaz coordinates its network of social services, 135 secondary schools, 5 madaris, 16 Islamic institutions, and a convoy of mobile clinics and blood banks.70 The Markaz employs a teaching philosophy emphasizing both Islamic and modern education. This combination of Islamic principles with science and technology is used, according to Saeed Shafqat, “to produce an alternate model of governance and development.” A Dawat university is even under construction at the compound.71 Hafiz Saeed also champions the twin roles of dawa and jihad, and the unique interweaving of jihad and tabligh are an LeT hallmark. According to Hafiz Saeed, “Islam propounds both Dawa and Jihad. Both are equally important and inseparable… The need is to fuse the two together. This is the only way to bring about change among individuals, society and the world.”72 This all culminates in an educational philosophy for LeT that presents modern technology, tabligh, and jihad as means to power. The power that Hafiz Saeed envisions is distinct from Western democratic politics. For him, “Islamic politics” harnesses the true desires and efficiencies of men by giving the people a sense of direction. According to Hafiz Saeed, Islam is contra democracy. He eschews the preaching of
63 Shafqat, “From Official Islam to Islamisim,” 144.
64 Mir, The True Face of Jehadis, p. 101.
65 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2004, 103.
66 Abbas, “The Militant Brigade,” 61.
67 Mir, The True Face of Jehadis, 101.
68 Shafqat, “From Official Islam to Islamisim,” 142.
69 Ibid.
70 Abbas, “The Militant Brigade,” 61. For a similar account, see Mir, The True Face of Jehadis, 97.
71 Shafqat, “From Official Islam to Islamisim,” 142. See also Mir, The True Face of Jehadis, 100.
72 Quoted in Shafqat, “From Official Islam to Islamisim,” 143.
20
those who believe that an Islamic society can burgeon within a democratic system.73 Western-style governance has corrupted the pristine rule of Islam, and the need is “to save the Ummah from this dangerous trend…and instead of adopting other systems [we] must restructure the entire system on Islamic principles.”74
The United States government placed LeT on its list of international terrorist organizations in 2001, and the Pakistani government placed the group on a watch list in 2003. Because of this increased scrutiny, the Markaz was eventually renamed Jamaat-ul-Dawa (JuD). Both Jamaat-ul-Dawa and LeT continue to grow despite the circumscription of LeT and despite JuD’s position on the government watch list.75 Hafiz Saeed was arrested on December 31, 2001, for his inflammatory speeches, but the Lahore High Court ordered his release a year later.76 Saeed then ceded control of the militant wing to Maulana Abdul Wahid Kashmiri and focused his efforts on leading Jamaat-ul-Dawa. There is speculation that this shift occurred in order to give the Musharraf government wiggle room amid claims that it is directly aiding militant groups.
Some analysts claim that LeT has become the new favorite of the Pakistani security forces since the split of Jaish-e-Mohammed (discussed below). It has also kept quiet regarding President Musharraf’s policy shifts on Afghanistan and India.77 Considering that Hafiz Saeed was set free and was able to continue his fiery speeches against India and the West, the claims of favoritism seem to have some veracity. While other groups felt the heavy hand of the Musharraf government in 2002 and 2003, Jamaat-ul-Dawa and LeT emerged relatively unscathed. There is speculation that this light treatment came as a result of careful guidance by Saeed’s allies in the government. In exchange for silence on the 2004 rapprochement with India—an event that stoked ire in many other groups—Jamaat-ul-Dawa and LeT were allowed to continue fund-raising, recruitment and training, and were assured that no restrictions on their activities would be implemented.78 LeT also does not target overtly the Pakistani establishment in its attacks, thus furthering the belief that it and the ISI remain close all
Amid the post-September 11, 2001 pressure, Hafiz Saeed claims that activities have continued unabated, with several thousand new fighters a year continuing to swell its ranks.79 It has been difficult to verify these figures and determine whether this is simply rhetoric to buoy sinking morale. But, there is little evidence that the operations of the Markaz or LeT are slowing.80 The group continues to recruit, provide education and other social services, and preach Ahle Hadith values to buttress its support base. Many analysts are also quick to point out that the Markaz and LeT have simply been put on a government watch list, while the clampdown on other groups and their offshoots was more heavy-handed. On the other hand, there may be a shift underway in the Pakistan army’s support of the group. In the middle of 2007, LeT cadres reportedly began using a new route to cross into Kashmir from India. In the past, the Pakistan army helped LeT reinforcements from Pakistan-administered Kashmir, but LeT cadres have recently been arrested
73 Mir, The True Face of Jehadis, 111.
74 Quoted in Shafqat, “From Official Islam to Islamisim,” 144.
75 Haqqani, “The Ideologies of South Asian Jihadi Groups,” 24. See also Mir, The True Face of Jehadis, 99.
76 Abbas, “The Militant Brigade,” 61.
77 Ibid., 60.
78 Ibid., 61. See also Mir, The True Face of Jehadis, 95-96.
79 Abbas, “The Militant Brigade,” 61.
80 See “Jamaatud Dawa Allowed to Stage Show of Strength,” The Herald (Pakistan), March 2006, 61. 21
after traveling from Karachi to Mumbai, the site of the July 2006 serial bombings in which LeT is the suspected culprit. A report of these arrests detailed the arduous journey from an LeT training camp to a safe house in Mumbai, where members were to stay until instructed to proceed north into Kashmir. According to information gleaned from those arrested, LeT militants are instructed to travel in pairs after leaving the training camp, and take this more circuitous route through India to reach Kashmir. This could suggest that the Pakistan army is no longer as forthcoming with its help on the LoC as it once was.81 Whether this signals a new permanent strategy for LeT is yet to be seen. However, it does mirror the current organizational trend among terrorist groups of launching small cells in order to avoid detection. If LeT has in fact been forced to find new routes through India, an increase in attacks within that country could increase as well.
Deobandi Groups
The Deobandi school of Islam takes its name from the Hanafi Madrassah-i-Deoband, founded in 1867 in the Indian state of Uttar Pradesh.82 Maulana Qasim Nanotvi, concerned with the encroachment of Western culture, believed in adherence to traditional Islamic values. Deobandis believe that the ills of Muslim society stem from a straying from the teachings of the Prophet.83
Another key aspect of the Deobandi school is the transnational scope of its ideology. Not only does it call for reversion to an earlier, purer form of Islam, Deobandis also eschew national borders and believe that Muslims should defend Islam in any region of the world. Like Maududi and JI, the Deobandis believe that the most important distinction is between the Umma and nonbelievers. And, according to Husain Haqqani, “Jihad has always been central to Deobandi thinking.”84
Mir Zohair Husain clarifies that Deobandis fall into a category of “traditionalist” Islam that is often mistakenly conflated with fundamentalism. While both traditionalists and fundamentalists are religiously conservative and generally object to Western culture and its ideas of governance, the similarities tend to end there. Fundamentalists, such as the Ahle Hadiths, look to the ancient, pristine age of Islam as the prototype for contemporary society. Traditionalists and the Deobandis are not as antagonistic to the “accretions” and “innovations” that Islam has accumulated from various local and regional practices, such as those that mark Sufi traditions in South Asia. This is partly due to the influence of ancient regional traditions and partly to avoid the popular backlash that Ahle Hadith leaders found upon first bringing their interpretation of Islam to the region. Deobandis, however, are a particularly austere brand of traditionalists. While they accept the veneration of saints and prophets, there is little tolerance for other
81 Praveen Swami, “Signs of Another Line of Control,” The Hindu (India), May 14, 2007, www.thehindu.com/2007/05/14/stories/2007051400991000.htm.
82 Haqqani, “The Ideologies of South Asian Jihadi Groups,” 20. See also Mir Zohair Husain, Global Islamic Politics (New York: Harper Collins, 1995), 81.
83 See Barbara Metcalf, “‘Traditionalist’ Islamic Activism: Deoband, Tablighis, and Talibs,” essay, Social Science Research Council’s After September 11 Archive, www.ssrc.org/sept11/essays/metcalf.htm.
84 Haqqani, “The Ideologies of South Asian Jihadi Groups,” 21.
22
embellishments. Moreover, Deobandis are strict believers in taqlid (adherence to prior legal rulings) and the rejection of ijtihad (independent interpretation of legal matters).85
Deobandi groups also enjoyed the good graces and support of the Zia-ul-Haq regime during the Afghan jihad against the Soviets. Many of the madaris established during that period followed the Deobandi school and provided sanctuary for refugees and mujahideen. This support reached its apogee when the Taliban, a group of Deobandi students, assumed power in Afghanistan.
Harkat-ul-Jihad-i-Islami (HuJI)
Harkat-ul-Jihad-i-Islami is in many respects the progenitor of the Deobandi jihadi groups, and Amir Rana refers to HuJI as the first organized jihadi organization in Pakistan.86 Maulana Irshad Ahmed formed HuJI in 1980 as part of the Afghan jihad.87 There are conflicting reports as to the exact origin of the group, however. Maulana Irshad Ahmed was killed in 1985, and according to Pakistani journalist Zaffar Abbas, Maulana Muzzaffar Kashmiri formed a group also calling itself HuJI in 1991, specifically to carry out militant jihad in Jammu and Kashmir. According to this report, the two groups eventually merged to form a united HuJI and came under the leadership of Qari Saifullah Akhtar.88 A competing claim says that the group was originally formed by the Jamaat-ul-Ulema-e-Islami (JUI) and the Tablighi Jamaat (TJ) as a relief organization for the Afghan mujahideen.89 There is some doubt to this claim, for an extremist political party (JUI) and an apolitical proselytizing group (TJ) would make an unlikely pair.
One explanation for these disparate accounts is the chaotic and nebulous jihadi network that emerged during the campaign against the Soviets in Afghanistan. While some groups formed under the guidance of the ISI, others formed organically from individual mosques and madaris, only later to develop links with the ISI. This begins to tie together some differing narratives. Amir Rana, for instance, writes that HuJI was a fighting force from its inception. After Irshad Ahmed led a group of religious scholars from the NWFP to receive military training in Afghanistan, HuJI became an integral source of manpower and religious mandate, in the form of religious decrees, for the jihad campaign. Eventually, HuJI came under the patronage of the ISI and was responsible for recruiting and training mujahideen.90 Upon the death of Irshad Ahmed, Qari Saifullah Akhtar was selected as the leader of HuJI, but this set off a power struggle that caused Maulana Fazlur Rehman Khalil to break away and form Harkat-ul-Mujahideen.91 Soon thereafter another split occurred within HuJI, and Maulana Kashmiri spawned the Jamait-ul-Mujahideen. It was in 1991 that Deobandi ulema in Karachi implored these three groups to reunite to better focus on the Kashmir front. (See the sections on Harkat-ul-Mujahideen and
85 Mir Zohair Husain, Global Islamic Politics, 80-91.
86 Amir Rana, A to Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan, 263.
87 Amir Rana, however, writes that HuJI was formed in 1979. See Amir Rana, A to Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan, 263.
88 Abbas, “The Militant Brigade,” 57.
89 South Asia Terrorism Portal, Group Profile, www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/terrorist_outfits/HuJI.htm.
90 Ali Chaudhry, “In the Spotlight: Harkat ul-Jihad-I-Islami (HuJI),” Report by the Center for Defense Information, August 16, 2004, http://www.cdi.org/program/document.cfm?DocumentID=2374&from_page=../index.cfm.
91 Amir Rana, A to Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan, 263.
23
Jaish-e-Mohammed.)92 Even though this merger never fully came to fruition, in 1991 the Deobandi groups began to turn their attention toward Kashmir.
Qari Saifullah Akhtar is a dynamic leader with connections that afforded HuJI many patrons. He was a student at the Banuri Masjid in Karachi, a seminary from which Harkat-ul-Mujahideen also grew93—a connection that smoothed the way for a merger with HuM. Akhtar was also a key player in the alliance of Osama bin Laden with Mullah Omar and the Taliban. The Taliban eventually brought Akhtar on as an adviser, and his forces were labeled the “Punjabi Taliban.”94
The group’s goals are the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to Pakistani control and the broader Islamization of Pakistani society.95 In the mid-1990s, HuJI was based mainly in Afghanistan and Karachi. Until the ouster of the Taliban, much of HuJI’s military training was run from six maskars (training camps) in Afghanistan. The group also operates a training camp in Pakistan-administered Kashmir and about fifty seminaries in Karachi, some of which also run preliminary training.96 The most recognized of these HuJI seminaries in Karachi is the Khalid bin Walid madrassa, which has been linked to several other jihadi groups as well as al Qaeda. The exact number of HuJI militants is unknown. It receives most of its manpower from madaris in Pakistan, especially in Punjab and the NWFP. It also provides military training to foreign mujahideen, who often then join its ranks.97 Its network extends to Bangladesh, Chechnya, Uzbekistan, and China,98 and HuJI militants hail from both Pakistan-administered and Indian-administered Kashmir, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. HuJI has branch offices in some forty districts of Pakistan from which funds are solicited. According to Amir Rana, HuJI has a Central Finance Committee that oversees the collection of these funds. Along with the donations that it receives, HuJI also makes a considerable profit from the sale of arms to other militant groups.99 It also purportedly receives funding from the ISI and wealthy Punjabi financiers.100
The group returned to the spotlight in August 2004 after the arrest of long-time leader Qari Saifullah Akhtar in Dubai. Akhtar was in hiding from Pakistani and U.S. authorities after the invasion of Afghanistan in late 2001, after receiving brief respites in South Waziristan and Saudi
92 South Asia Terrorism Portal, Group Profile, www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/terrorist_outfits/HuJI.htm.
93 “Significance of Qari Saifullah Akhtar’s arrest,” Daily Times (Pakistan), August 9, 2004, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_9-8-2004_pg3_1.
94 Amir Rana, A to Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan, 271; “Significance of Qari Saifullah Akhtar’s arrest.”
95 See U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2005, 239; South Asia Terrorism Portal, Group Profile, www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/terrorist_outfits/HuJI.htm ; MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, www.tkb.org/Group.jsp?groupID=4613; Amir Rana, A to Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan, 272.
96 Amir Rana, A to Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan, 268; “Significance of Qari Saifullah Akhtar’s arrest,” Daily Times (Pakistan), August 9, 2004. http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_9-8-2004_pg3_1.
97 See Amir Rana, A to Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan, 267; U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2005, p. 239; South Asia Terrorism Portal, Group Profile, www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/terrorist_outfits/HuJI.htm.
98 Amir Rana, A to Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan, 263.
99 Ibid., 267.
100 See Abbas, “The Militant Brigade,” 57; U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2005, 239; South Asia Terrorism Portal, Group Profile, www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/terrorist_outfits/HuJI.htm.
24
Arabia. The fact that Akhtar was able to find refuge in such varied environments attests to HuJI’s extensive connections throughout South Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle East.
The group has made a name for itself through its vicious campaign of violence, causing the United States to place it on the list of international terrorist groups. There are differing accounts of when HuJI began launching attacks in Jammu and Kashmir. One source reports that HuJI militants first crossed into the area in 1992; however, Amir Rana writes that a group of sixteen militants crossed into Kashmir as early as 1991. HuJI is also thought to have sacrificed the greatest number of mujahideen in Kashmir. These operations are often carried out more in the manner of army maneuvers, with large numbers of militants directly confronting Indian forces rather than using guerrilla tactics.101
Throughout its evolution, HuJI has spread its activities far and wide. In 1995, Qari Saifullah Akhtar and four officers in the Pakistani army were arrested for an attempted coup to overthrow the government of Benazir Bhutto and install an Islamic regime. The four officers were tried and sentenced, but Akhtar was never charged. It was after this incident that he fled to Afghanistan and into the arms of the Taliban. The ouster of the Taliban exposed Akhtar’s links to the regime and precipitated a split within HuJI. The faction under Maulana Kashmiri insisted that it operated only in Kashmir, and formally disassociated itself from Akhtar. Meanwhile, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen continued to operate independently in both Kashmir and Afghanistan. The faction led by Akhtar, subsequently renamed Harkat-ul-Jihad-i-Islami-al-Alami, was responsible for attacks in Pakistan and on foreign targets in Afghanistan as a backlash against the Musharraf government and the West.102 HuJI is also responsible for frequent attacks on Indian army outposts and government officials in Jammu and Kashmir.
The group is also implicated in the January 2002 attack on the Kolkata office of the United States Information Service (USIS) and is linked to the group al-Faran, which kidnapped and murdered five Western tourists in 1995.103 HuJI has been linked, along with several other groups, to the suicide attack that killed eleven French engineers in Karachi in 2002.104 There is little corroborating evidence for HuJI’s involvement in these latter attacks, however. Several sources report that HuJI has been largely dormant since 2002. Amir Rana writes that the collapse of the Taliban also augured the demise of HuJI. Without its Deobandi allies to provide sanctuary, many of the group’s foreign cadres dispersed, and Pakistani mujahideen in Pakistan-administered Kashmir have been instructed to cooperate with other militant groups.105
Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM)
Maulana Fazlur Rehman Khalil founded Harkat-ul-Mujahideen in 1985 as a splinter faction from Harakat-ul-Jihad-i-Islami. HuM’s history is quite complex, and the group has actually existed under this name at two separate times since its inception. HuM broke with its parent organization
101 Amir Rana, A to Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan, 269. However, the South Asia Terrorism Portal gives 1992 as the year that HuJI first crossed into Indian-administered Kashmir. See South Asia Terrorism Portal, Group Profile, www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/terrorist_outfits/HuJI.htm.
102 Abbas, “The Militant Brigade,” 57.
103 Chaudhry, “In the Spotlight. See also U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2005, 239.
104 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2005, 239.
105 Amir Rana, A to Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan, 272-73.
25
due to internecine fighting, but it retained many of the goals of HuJI. These primarily involved assisting the Afghan jihad and expelling Soviet forces. Starting in 1993, the group reunited with HuJI after influential Deobandi clerics persuaded Khalil and leaders of HuJI to merge for the sake of a consolidated effort on the Kashmiri front. This merger formed Harkat-ul-Ansar (HuA). A full merger lasted only four years, but under the leadership of Maulana Saadatullah Khan, attacks in Kashmir increased dramatically.106 The merger was not a complete success, for it also led to the quick arrest of several top leaders, including Maulana Masood Azhar, a prominent Deobandi writer and propagandist. At the time of the merger, the group’s strength was reported at about a thousand members, primarily Pakistanis and Afghans, though HuA did maintain ties with some of the so-called Arab-Afghans who remained after the Soviet retreat.107
This connection began to forge a pan-Islamic ideology that included the violent annexation of Kashmir by Pakistan, and armed struggle against nonbelievers, secular Muslim governments, and the West—which HuM continues to follow.108 Harkat-ul-Ansar’s links with the Arab-Afghans and Osama bin Laden eventually spelled the end of the nominal merger between HuM and HuJI. After several failed attempts to secure the release of Azhar and the other detained leaders, the U.S. State Department placed HuA on the list of international terrorist entities in 1997.109
The group reemerged the following year under the moniker Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, with the same goal of unifying Muslims in South Asia and the broader world. The merger agreement that formed HuA was always contingent on HuM and HuJI being able to revert to their original forms should the union dissolve.110 Therefore, Fazlur Rehman Khalil reconstituted HuM and later signed Osama bin Laden’s 1998 fatwa against Israel and the West after the U.S. bombing of an alleged al Qaeda training camp in Khost, Afghanistan. The bombing resulted in the deaths of HuM mujahideen, and Khalil vowed to “definitely take revenge for this from America.”111 Khalil eventually stepped down as HuM leader in February 2000, replaced by his second in command, Farooqi Kashmiri.112
Harkat-ul-Mujahideen has spread its ideology and activities beyond Jammu and Kashmir, to India and Bangladesh. It was implicated, along with HuJI, in the attack on the USIS office in Kolkata,113 signaling that the split between the two groups was never a full one. Its support for the Taliban regime—many of whose members have links to HuM members through madrassa education—soon placed it back under the microscope. The group was banned in late 2001 after crackdowns by the Musharraf government and ramped-up U.S. efforts against radical Islamist organizations.114 There are two separate accounts of what happened to HuM after the 2002 ban.
106 Ibid., 245-46.
107 “Trailing the Militants,” The Herald (Pakistan), December 2003, 61.
108 MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, www.tkb.org/Group.jsp?groupID=50 (accessed January 12, 2007).
109 See ibid.; “Trailing the Militants,”61.; U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2005, 196; and South Asia Terrorism Portal, Group Profile, www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/terrorist_outfits/harkatul_mujahideen.htm.
110 Amir Rana, A to Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan, 246.
111 Ibid., 252.
112 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2005, 196.
113 Swami, “Terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir,” 59.
114 Amir Mir, however, writes that HuM was banned by the United States in 1999, after Khalil signed Osama bin Laden’s fatwa against the West. See Amir Rana, A to Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan, 251.
26
Several reports state that HuM reemerged yet again, as Jamiat-ul-Ansar, which was subsequently banned by the Pakistani government in 2003.115 However, another account tells of internal squabbles over organizational matters that caused a cadre of members to split and form Harkat-ul-Mujahideen-al-Alami (HuMA). This group has been linked to assassination attempts against Pervez Musharraf as well as to the June 2002 attack on the U.S. Consulate in Karachi. It is also believed to have links to al Qaeda via aid and arms from tribal leaders in NWFP and from other militant groups in Pakistan.116 However, some intelligence sources in Pakistan believe that HuMA is simply a front for the original group and that no formal split ever occurred. According to this line of thinking, the split was a diversionary tactic by the original HuM so it could operate unimpeded and begin targeting Musharraf and U.S. interests in Pakistan.117
Harkat-ul-Mujahideen is primarily focused on the conflict in Kashmir and is politically linked to the Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam Fazlur Rehman (JUI-F) faction, a Deobandi religious organization.118 It is based primarily in Muzaffarabad and Rawalpindi and conducts training in Pakistan. Until late 2001, it also trained fighters in the eastern provinces of Afghanistan.119 The two most prominent training camps for HuM are located in Mansehra in the NWFP and in Muzaffarabad in Pakistan-administered Kashmir respectively. The former is the largest of the HuM camps and can host about seven hundred militants-in-training at a time. Over the evolution of HuM, a shift has occurred in the demographics of recruits. In its early years, HuM drew its cadres mainly from the madaris connected with the group and its leaders. Around the time that the focus turned toward Kashmir, HuM began recruiting young men from public schools, and by 1995, members who did not have a madrassa education outnumbered those who did receive religious training—an important issue that is discussed below. Some of these recruits are introduced to the group through itinerant recruitment cells that extend invitations to jihad after sermons at local mosques. Punjab and Karachi remain the most well represented areas in HuM.120
Although Maulana Fazlur Rehman Khalil’s control over the group pervades almost every activity, HuM is considered to have a loosely organized structure. Its four main bodies are the Military Department, the Dawat-o-Irshad (Center for Preaching and Education), the Finance Department, and the Media and Publication Department. The Media Department publishes the monthly Sada-e-Mujahid and the bimonthly al Hilal, as well as other propaganda. HuM operates from about two dozen offices in Pakistan,121 maintaining an extensive network both within Pakistan and internationally. It is linked to conflicts in Chechnya, Afghanistan, and Tajikistan. The strength of HuM is reported at several thousand armed supporters throughout Pakistan and Kashmir, though it lost many members and material assets after the 2000 formation of Jaish-e-
115 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2005, 197.
116 South Asia Terrorism Portal, Group Profile, www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/terroristoutfits/HuMA.htm.
117 Mir, The True Face of Jehadis, 116, 120.
118 Evans, “The Kashmir Insurgency,” 71.
119 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2005, 197.
120 Amir Rana, A to Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan, 245, 250-51. Some current research that supports this idea of a trend by militant groups of recruiting their cadres from the public education system. This counters the oft-cited notion that the madaris provide the lion’s share of militant recruits. See C. Christine Fair, “Islamic Education in Pakistan,” trip report presented at the United States Institute of Peace (March 20, 2006), http://www.usip.org/events/2006/0320_fair.html.
121 Amir Rana, A to Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan, 251.
27
Mohammed.122 Currently, its members are mostly Pakistani and Kashmiri, though its ranks contain Afghans, Arab veterans of the Afghan war, and fighters from the wider Muslim world.123
Along with its operations against Indian forces and civilians in Kashmir, HuM is also linked to the aforementioned kidnapping and murder of five Western tourists in 1995. It was also one of the key groups behind the 1999 hijacking of Indian Airlines Flight IC-814, which resulted in the release of Maulana Masood Azhar and Ahmed Omar Sheikh. The sources of HuM’s financial assets are varied, but the extent of its holdings is unknown. The group receives donations from wealthy patrons in the Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia, as well as from local donors in Pakistan and Kashmir. Harkat also calls for donations through advertising and pamphleteering. It has recently moved many of its assets into “legitimate” business, such as real estate, commodities trading, and manufacturing, after the Pakistani government restricted its fund-raising and recruiting activities.124
Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM)
In January 2000, Maulana Masood Azhar announced his formal split with HuM, and the formation of Jaish-e-Mohammad. Azhar was until then an influential leader of HuM, but after the Indian Airlines hijacking he decided to separate from the group. It is reported that Maulana Azhar, in addition to several other religious leaders in Pakistan, was upset by the infighting that divided the jihadi cause. These leaders, according to Amir Rana, announced their dissociation with all groups they had associated with as far back as 1998. After much deliberation and consultation with Islamic scholars and elders, it was decided that Maulana Azhar would lead the effort to refresh the jihadi cause by forming a new group under strong leadership that would avoid the rifts that had emerged in other groups. The formation of JeM came with the blessing of the heads of the Majlis-e-Tawan-e-Islami, Darul Ifta-e-Wal-Irshad, and Sheikh-ul-Haddith Dar-ul-Haqqania religious schools. Many leaders immediately gave their allegiance to Maulana Azhar as the establishment of JeM, with at least one pronouncing the Maulana “the Ameer of all Pakistani mujahideen.”125
JeM first appeared in Karachi but is now based in Bahawalpur and reportedly has links to other Sunni sectarian militant groups. Upon its creation, JeM received full support from Sipah-e-Sahaba and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi,126 and it is politically aligned with the Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam Fazlur Rehman faction.127 JeM espouses a pan-Islamic ideology that is anti-West, anti-Jewish, and anti-India. Inspirational leader Maulana Azhar’s firebrand personality had much bearing on the formation of JeM. Azhar is the author of some of the most recent texts on the Deobandi interpretation of Islam, including Ma’arka (The Struggle), Tuhfa-e-Sadaat (The Gift of Virtue), and Faza’il Jihad (The Virtue of Jihad). The Virtue of Jihad is Azhar’s translation of the classical
122 “Trailing the Militants,” 61.; U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2005, 197.
123 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2005, 197; see also Mir, The True Face of Jehadis, 122.
124 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2005, 197.
125 Amir Rana, A to Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan, 217; “Trailing the Militants,” 61; MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, www.tkb.org/Group.jsp?groupID=58.
126 Amir Rana, A to Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan, 221; “Trailing the Militants,” 62.
127 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2005, 201.
28
text by Ibn Nahhas, a student of Ibn Taimiyah.128 The themes in the texts focus primarily on the disadvantaged position of Muslims subjugated by Western culture. In The Struggle, Azhar pens an invitation to Muslim youth to join JeM, motivating them with stories of earlier Muslim conquests against unbelievers. The most prominent of these texts is the comparison between the British colonial rule and the current onslaught of a culture of secularism and unbelief. This is epitomized by India’s presence in Kashmir and the coalition presence in Afghanistan—two lands over which (proper) Islam should reign. According to Azhar, only when Islam is firmly entrenched in politics and society can the damage wrought by “submission and slavery” be repaired.129
In his A to Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan, Amir Rana outlines a highly complex structure organized for both military and tablighi operations.130 A twelve-member Majlis-e-Shura, headed by the ameer (Maulana Azhar), governs JeM and oversees the group’s seven departments. The Military Department organizes the training and fielding of jihadis along with identifying targets. The Department of “Aseerin” (Prisoners) works to gain the release of captured mujahideen, so far without any positive results. The Department of Dawa-o-Irshad orchestrates the tabligh work of JeM and maintains ties with the families of martyred mujahideen. This latter function is also shared with the Department of Martyrs, which compiles lists of martyrs and potential martyrs, updates the families on the status of their kin’s martyrdom, provides an aid stipend after the death of the mujahid, and accords special status to the families. This department is also responsible for attending to the shahid’s (martyr’s) will as well as arranging a memorial service in his honor. The Department of Amar Bil Ma’aruf-o-Nahi Annal Munkar-Ehtesab (Enforcing Virtue and Preventing Vice, and Accountability) ensures that the activities and conduct of the group’s members adhere to Shariah, and it also maintains contacts with madrassa leaders in order to gain recruits from the schools. JeM also maintains a Department of Ehya-e-Sunnah (Revival of Sunnat), which arranges marriages not only for mujahideen but also for any religious men and women who approach the department. The Department of Broadcast (Media) and Publication, one of JeM’s most active components, maintains contacts with media and publishes the group’s pamphlets and magazines, including Jaish-e Mohammed (later renamed al Islah) and Shamshir.
Jaish-e-Mohammed claimed responsibility for the October 1, 2001, attack on the Kashmir legislative assembly in Srinigar, center of Indian-administered Kashmir, which killed thirty-one people, but it has since rescinded the claim. JeM, along with LeT, has also been blamed for the attack on the Indian Parliament on December 13, 2001, which killed nine.131 JeM was among the groups implicated in the assassination attempts on President Musharraf in late 2003 after officials traced the phone numbers on the mobile phone of one of the suicide bombers. The
128 Ibn Taimiyah was a thirteenth- and fourteenth-century Islamic scholar who sought to return the religion to its roots. He was a major influence for Muhammad ibn-Abdul Wahhab, among others.
129 See Husain Haqqani, “The Gospel of Jihad,” Foreign Policy (September-October 2002): 72-74.
130 See Amir Rana, A to Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan, 224-30. To the contrary, the South Asia Terrorism Portal states that there are no reports of a governing structure to JeM. See South Asia Terrorism Portal, Group Profile, www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/terrorist_outfits/jaish_e_mohammad_mujahideen_e_tanzeem.htm.
131 South Asia Terrorism Portal, Group Profile, www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/terrorist_outfits/jaish_e_mohammad_mujahideen_e_tanzeem.htm.
29
group has also been linked to attacks against Christian churches, and Omar Saeed Sheikh, a JeM leader, was sentenced to death for the murder of the journalist Daniel Pearl.132 JeM also aggressively attacks Indian security forces in Kashmir, and several militants with connections to JeM have been arrested deep inside India. Many of its operations are fidayeen attacks, in which the militants will enter an apparently inescapable situation and cause as much damage as possible before being killed. They also conduct the more familiar form of suicide attack in the form of suicide bombings.133 There is some debate whether JeM was the first Pakistani group to use suicide attacks, but it was certainly among the first.134 One report quotes experts who believe that JeM introduced suicide missions to the Pakistan jihadi scene in December 25, 2000, when a JeM fighter drove a car bomb into an army installation in Srinagar.135 Jaish-e-Mohammed was also linked to the July 2007 Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) standoff, as many of the hard-line elements that led the violent clashes with security forces were reportedly linked to the group. The wider Deobandi lineage runs heavily through the Lal Masjid. Moreover, Fazlur Rehman Khalil was reportedly in the delegation that relayed messages between deputy prayer leader Abdul Rashid Ghazi, who was later killed, and the government.136
Although JeM’s cadres are mainly Pakistanis and Kashmiris, Afghans and Arab veterans of the Afghan war are also in its ranks. The group’s size is estimated at several hundred armed supporters.137 JeM has become particularly adept at using local schools for recruitment. Like many jihadi organizations, it maintains student wings and tabligh teams that visit madaris, government schools, and colleges, and, as mentioned, it has an entire department devoted to the tasks of recruiting students for military training and soliciting donations.138 Along with cannibalizing many of HuM’s resources, JeM has also received support through the camaraderie of Afghan war veterans. It has been reported that the ISI, the Taliban and Osama bin Laden, and several other Sunni groups in Pakistan gave Maulana Azhar seed money and other resources to establish JeM.139 The Al Rashid Trust, an important charity organization once linked to al Qaeda and the Taliban, reportedly provided Rs20 million in seed money, but there is some disagreement
132 See U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2005, 201; and Zaffar Abbas, “The Pakistani Al-Qaeda,” The Herald (Pakistan), August 2004, 55-58. See also Moosa Kaleem, “Meet the Militants,” The Herald (Pakistan), June 2006, 74-75.
133 South Asia Terrorism Portal, Group Profile, www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/terrorist_outfits/jaish_e_mohammad_mujahideen_e_tanzeem.htm.
134 In his book, Amir Rana states that LeT began making fidayeen attacks in India and Indian-administered Kashmir before LeT.
135 Massoud Ansari, “Suicide City,” Newsline (Pakistan), June 2004, , www.newsline.com.pk/NewsJun2004/cover1jun2004.htm.
136 Aamer Ahmed Khan, “Can Musharraf Contain the Militant Threat?” BBC News, July 13, 2007, news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6897683.stm; “Government in talks with Lal Masjid cleric,” Daily Times (Pakistan), July 10, 2007, www.dailytimes.com.pk/print.asp?page=2007\07\10\story_10_-7-2007_pg1_1.
137 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2005, 201-2.
138 Amir Rana, A to Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan, 97.
139 Maulana Azhar maintained close ties to the Taliban, many of whose members Azhar befriended in his years at the Darul Uloom Islamia Binori town mosque. The mosque is one of the most influential Deobandi centers in the world, and it was the epicenter for recruitment for the Afghan jihad. See Swami, “Terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir”; MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, www.tkb.org/Group.jsp?groupID=58 (accessed January 12, 2007); South Asia Terrorism Portal, Group Profile, www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/terrorist_outfits/jaish_e_mohammad_mujahideen_e_tanzeem.htm.
30
whether Al Rashid provides direct assistance to jihadi organizations.140 Like HuM, JeM also solicits donations through advertising and pamphleteering. And after receiving government scrutiny, it, too, invested many of its assets in such legitimate practices as manufacturing, real estate, and commodities trading.141 It has also been reported that many wealthy patrons in the Middle East have contributed to JeM’s coffers. In December 2001, Pakistani authorities apprehended Maulana Azhar and placed him under temporary house arrest at the behest of the United States, but he was soon released. However, rifts began to show within the group, and reports differ on the nature of the formal splintering of JeM.
Jamaat-ul-Furqan
In late 2001, Maulana Abdul Jabbar, commander of JeM’s military operations, and other prominent members of JeM began to call for increased attacks on Western interests in Pakistan. After originally joining Harkat-ul-Ansar in 1993, Jabbar eventually aligned himself with Maulana Fazlur Rehman Khalil’s faction after the split in HuA. Jabbar joined JeM upon its creation, and he was responsible for training mujahideen in Afghanistan. After the ouster of the Taliban, he was forced to retreat to Pakistan. This turned Jabbar’s focus to countering Western (namely, U.S.) influence within Pakistan, a strategy that purportedly received Maulana Azhar’s blessing.142 In late 2002, a string of bombings rocked Christian churches in Islamabad, Muree, and Taxila. These terrorist activities were quickly followed by condemnation from authorities, and scrutiny of JeM intensified.
According to one account, Maulana Azhar and Maulana Jabbar were at odds over whether the rebuke by the government warranted compliance. Jaish-e-Mohammed leaders fought off claims that Maulana Azhar had countenanced the attacks, by claiming that those dissident members who had called for attacks against U.S. interests had already been expelled from JeM for insubordination. Maulana Azhar also tried to paint Maulana Jabbar and his faction as nothing more than “sectarian terrorists.”143 Maulana Azhar, reportedly instructed by his interlocutors within the Pakistani security services, shied away from attacks against U.S. targets and remained silent on Pakistan’s relationship with the United States. Nonetheless, the Pakistani government formally banned Jaish-e-Mohammed in January 2002, forcing Maulana Azhar to rename the group Khuddam ul-Islam.
Pakistan eventually banned both Jamaat-ul-Furqan and Khuddam ul-Islam in November 2003, but the two continued to be embroiled in a bitter dispute. As with JeM’s own earlier split from its parent organization, the creation of Jamaat-ul-Furqan apparently triggered another fight over resources and sponsors. Leaders of Jamaat-ul-Furqan accused Maulana Azhar and those in his inner circle of using group resources for their own benefit. As Amir Mir observes in The True Face of Jehadis, while much of the money that flowed into JeM was used to maintain training camps and to make donations to the families of martyred cadres, some saw Maulana Azhar’s lifestyle improve remarkably. Maulana Azhar has fallen prey to an accusation lobbed at many jihadi leaders: that his wealth has increased at the expense of the rank and file. At one point, JeM
140 See Mir, The True Face of Jehadis, 73; Amir Rana, A to Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan, 233.
141 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2005, 202.
142 “Trailing the Militants,” 62.
143 Abbas, “The Militant Brigade,” 60.
31
reportedly collected approximately one million rupees per day. Maulana Azhar apparently amassed considerable wealth and lived a lavish lifestyle using these funds.144 Also, many of the dissenters cried nepotism and felt that Maulana Azhar’s attempts to quash internal strife by forming a strong center had a deleterious effect on operations.145 It has been reported that Maulana Azhar did in fact expel Maulana Jabbar from JeM and place his own brother, Mohammad Ibrahim, in the seat as JeM chief supreme commander.146
Disputes have also arisen over the direction that JeM was taking with jihad. The ouster of the Taliban in Afghanistan did much to disrupt JeM’s training activities by taking away access to key facilities. JeM supposedly stopped going after Western targets at the behest of authorities, despite mounting evidence against the group for the assassination attempts on President Musharraf.147 Maulana Azhar’s perceived lack of leadership enraged those members who wanted to take an antagonistic approach toward the West. Maulana Jabbar then accused Azhar of going soft on jihad, saying that he had abandoned the cause. Thus, according to one account, Maulana Abdullah Shah Mazhar and Maulana Jabbar broke from JeM as early as October 2001 to form a competing group that would become Jamaat-ul-Furqan. Jabbar was taken into custody and interrogated for his involvement in terrorist attacks on Christian churches in Islamabad, Murree, and Taxila in 2002;148 however, security agents released him in August 2149
Sipah-e-Sahaba (SSP)
Sipah-e-Sahaba is a splinter group from the predominant Deobandi political party in Pakistan, Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Islam.150 Initially called Anjuman-e-Sipah-e-Sahaba, it currently operates under the name Millat-e-Islamia Pakistan, but the latter name was also banned in late 2003. Founded in 1985 by Maulana Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, Maulana Zi-ur-Rehman Farooqi, Maulana Eesar-ul-Haq Qasmi, and Maulana Azam Tariq, SSP is a leading Sunni Deobandi group in Pakistan. SSP wants to make Pakistan a Sunni state under a narrow interpretation of Hanafi Islam that seeks to restore the caliphate and also aims to have the government officially declare the Shia a non-Muslim minority (much as it has done to the Ahmadi since 1974). Also adamantly opposed to Pakistan’s alliance with the United States since September 11, 2001, SSP deems America’s retaliation an attack on Islam and therefore subject to legitimate jihad.151
SSP’s birth came against a backdrop of sectarian violence in Pakistan that was sparked by the competing forces of the 1979 Iranian revolution and the ambitious Islamization project of General Zia-ul-Haq. As Shias in Pakistan became emboldened by events in Iran, a battle between Shias and the Sunni regime soon ignited into a larger clash between the Shia and Sunni communities. The Shia in Pakistan mobilized with a vigor that the regime believed threatened
144 Ibid., 60.
145 See Mir, The True Face of Jehadis, 73.
146 “Trailing the Militants,” 62.
147 Abbas, “The Militant Brigade,” 60.
148 “Trailing the Militants,” 62.
149 Mir, The True Face of Jehadis, 72.
150 MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base Group Profile, www.tkb.org/Group.jsp?groupID=3870.
151 South Asia Terrorism Portal, Group Profile, www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/terroristoutfits/ssp.htm.
32
the building of an “Islamic State.”152 The increasingly restive Shias and their opposition to the Zia government’s narrow interpretation of Islam initiated a backlash by Sunni imams. Many of these imams, including Haq Nawaz, were instrumental in pushing for the Ahmadis to be officially declared non-Muslims in 1974. Shia activism during the early 1980s also fueled the desire to do the same with the Shias, as many of the imams have long wanted.153
Sipah-e-Sahaba was formed partly as a result of the socioeconomic conditions in the Jhang area, its headquarters. Jhang was still largely administered under a feudal-type system in which large landholders remained dominant in society and politics. A majority of these landholders were Shia. However, as Jhang developed into a thriving market town and a crossroads between central and southern Punjab, Sunni shopkeepers, merchants, and traders demanded a greater voice in society.154 Haq Nawaz viewed Jhang as a “backward district” that had been corrupted by a noxious combination of Shia, Sufi, and local customs. SSP’s goals of combating Shia at all levels and striving to make Pakistan a Sunni state appealed to the urbanized leaders and institutions of Karachi and Peshawar. Though it has failed to take hold outside urban centers, SSP nonetheless believes that it must confront the corrupt Shia and Sufi influence in rural areas. The formation of SSP marked the meteoric rise of sectarian violence against the quasi-feudal status quo.155 The late 1980s and 1990s were marked by a spate of attacks and reprisals by both Sunni and Shia, including the murders of several Iranian diplomats and the assassination of Maulana Jhangvi in 1990.
During this spiral of violence, SSP continually accumulated sophisticated weaponry, which it used in attacks targeting both Shia and law enforcement.156 The Pakistan government has repeatedly tried to tamp down sectarian violence by arresting SSP members, urging their leaders to cease the attacks, and threatening to close the madaris from which the group draws many of its members. However, as the government continued to support mujahideen in Afghanistan and Kashmir, the SSP madaris were also used by HuM, a group—along with JeM—from which SSP cadres have received support and training.157 As the latter groups became the lynchpin of Pakistan’s Kashmir campaign, SSP also benefited as a result of strong links between the groups.158 This soon led to infighting within the group, as a radicalized faction led by Riaz Basra accused SSP’s leadership of moderating its position after talks with militant Shia groups.159
152 S. V. R. Nasr, “Islam, the State and the Rise of Sectarian Militancy in Pakistan,” in Pakistan: Nationalism without a Nation? ed. Christophe Jaffrelot (London: Zed Books, 2002), 87.
153 Muhammad Qasim Zaman, “Sectarianism in Pakistan: The Radicalization of Shi’i and Sunni Identities,” Modern Asian Studies 32, no. 3 (July 1998): 699.
154 “Trailing the Militants,” 62.
155 The majority of large landholders in the Jhang region have historically been wealthy Shia, and class divisions exacerbate sectarian tensions. For in-depth discussions of the rise of sectarian rifts in Pakistan, see Zaman, “Sectarianism in Pakistan,” 689-716, and Nasr, “Islam, the State and the Rise of Sectarian Militancy in Pakistan,” 85-114.
156 See South Asia Terrorism Portal, Group Profile, www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/terroristoutfits/ssp.htm.
157 See Nasr, “Islam, the State and the Rise of Sectarian Militancy in Pakistan,” 94-95; and South Asia Terrorism Portal, Group Profile, www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/terroristoutfits/ssp.htm.
158 Nasr, “Islam, the State and the Rise of Sectarian Militancy in Pakistan,” 94-95.
159 Ibid., 99. 33
This radicalized faction became the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), the name reflecting the belief that this wing was carrying out the true mission of the original SSP leader. After the assassination in 1990 of its founder, Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, and deputy leader Israr-ul-Haq Qasimi, internal battles over resources erupted, and SSP began to fracture.160 SSP has since generated many splinter factions, but there is uncertainty over how much independence these groups attained. As S. V. R. Nasr points out, many of these factions did not become fully autonomous groups but maintained ties with SSP and, in some instances, fully reintegrated. The relationship between SSP and LeJ remains equally ambiguous. Some analysts have pointed out that LeJ provides a convenient cover for SSP to continue its anti-Shia violence. SSP tries to press its agenda through political channels, disavowing any connection to LeJ while LeJ continues to press the agenda through militancy.161 Although SSP tries to maintain a legitimate political role through contesting election results and participating in provincial coalition governments, its members are known to have murdered hundreds of Shias.162
This rift in SSP did not slow the sectarian violence that gripped Pakistan. After the assassination of Zia-ur-Rehman-Farooqi, Jhangvi’s successor as head of SSP, an Iranian diplomat and five Iranian military personnel were killed in separate attacks. Finally, President Musharraf formally banned SSP in January 2002, and Maulana Azam Tariq, Farooqi’s successor, was arrested. Azam Tariq had assumed the parliamentary position originally won by Israr-ul-Haq Qasimi in 1990, and contested elections in October 2002, winning an MNA seat from Jhang.163 Azam Tariq renamed the group from his jail cell, but he was subsequently released after joining the Pakistan Muslim League Quaid-i-Azam (PML-Q)-led coalition government. He was assassinated in Islamabad in October 2003 and succeeded by Maulana Mohammad Ahmed Ludhianvi.164
According to Muhammad Qasim Zaman, SSP is typical of other sectarian organizations within Pakistan in that it promotes a sectarian identity through “dexterous and profuse use of print, and the use of mosques and madrasas as media of recruitment and organization.”165 As charismatic preachers such as Azam Tariq, and prayer leaders attract a larger and more influential following in urban centers such as Karachi, these particular mosques or madaris become important centers of education and propaganda for SSP. Currently, the Jamia Farooqi in Lahore and the Jamia Mahmudia in Jhang are the centers for SSP, with the former monitoring all nationwide activities.166
The rise of these centers also provides the path for these preachers’ and prayer leaders’ ascension to the supreme council that oversees the group. The group holds sway in all four provinces, especially Punjab and Sindh, and it operates fund-raising activities through the madaris, militant groups, and other political groups.167 It also uses a publications arm to get out its message, especially through its monthly Khilafat-i-Rashida journal. Through this propaganda, it not only updates readers on the activities of Shias against Sunnis but also informs them of its own
160 See Amir Rana, A to Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan, 202-3.
161 Nasr, “Islam, the State and the Rise of Sectarian Militancy in Pakistan,” 99.
162 MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base Group Profile, www.tkb.org/Group.jsp?groupID=3870.
163 Zaman, “Sectarianism in Pakistan: The Radicalization of Shi’i and Sunni Identities,” 711-13.
164 “Trailing the Militants,” 63.
165 Zaman, “Sectarianism in Pakistan,” 714.
166 Amir Rana, A to Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan, 199.
167 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2004, 126.
34
activities in combating Shia influence and caring for the families of Sunnis who have died in sectarian violence.168 It helps these families as well as incarcerated and unemployed party workers through the Sipah Sahaba Welfare Trust.169 Amir Rana reports that the group has never used a formal channel for fund-raising, though it does receive significant contributions from wealthy businesspeople and from donors in Saudi Arabia. SSP also gets funding from varied sources such as zakat (tithing or alms) and it receives support from other extremist groups.170
SSP also organizes anti-Shia rallies and continues to spearhead campaigns to declare Shia non-Muslims. It calls for the assassination of Shia leaders and for attacks on Shia worshippers. It is thought to have between 3,000 and 6,000 activists to carry out these varied activities, which are coordinated from some 500 offices and branches throughout Punjab as well as from international offices in countries such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Canada, Bangladesh, and the UK. It is widely considered one of the most powerful and influential sectarian groups in Pakistan.171
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ)
As mentioned above, Riaz Basra, along with Akram Lahori and Malik Ishaque, created Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) as a radical offshoot of Sipah-e-Sahaba in 1996. According to S. V. R. Nasr, however, LeJ was possibly formed as early as 1990 as a result of the aforementioned rifts within SSP. From that time, the group was very active in sectarian violence, even overtaking SSP in terms of assassinations. This trend has apparently continued, because LeJ has carried out most of the major attacks in Pakistan since September 11, 2001. Amir Mir states that LeJ appears to be “the group of choice for hard-core militants who are adamant to carry out their jehadi agenda in Pakistan.”172 LeJ’s split from SSP has had little bearing on the ties, however ambivalent, that the two groups maintain.173 Lashkar-e-Jhangvi is based primarily in Punjab and Karachi.174 The group directs violence against the Pakistani Shia community, and President Musharraf attempted to curtail rampant sectarian violence by banning the group in August 2001. The resulting crackdown led to the death of Riaz Basra in May 2002 after a shootout with police. Akram Lahori is reported to be Basra’s successor, but he is in police custody, and it is not known whether he still commands the group from prison.175
Despite the leadership of a Supreme Council and the prominence of Riaz Basra, Akram Lahori, and Malik Ishaque, some reports on the structure of LeJ point to its strength as a loosely knit network of small cells. Each cell is reported to consist of five to eight members, operating
168 Zaman, “Sectarianism in Pakistan,” 705.
169 Amir Rana, A to Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan, 199.
170 See South Asia Terrorism Portal, Group Profile, www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/terroristoutfits/ssp.htm; and Amir Rana, A to Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan, 201).
171 See South Asia Terrorism Portal, Group Profile, www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/terroristoutfits/ssp.htm; and Mir, The True Face of Jehadis, 171.
172 Ibid., 177.
173 Nasr, “Islam, the State and the Rise of Sectarian Militancy in Pakistan,” 98-99.
174 Anthony Keats, “Lashkar I Jhangvi,” Center for Defense Information (March 3, 2003), www.cdi.org/terrorism/lij.cfm. See also South Asia Terrorism Portal, Group Profile, www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/terroristoutfits/lej.htm.
175 South Asia Terrorism Portal, Group Profile, www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/terroristoutfits/lej.htm.
35
independently and without knowledge of other cells. According to law enforcement, the cells are also believed to disperse after an attack and meet at a rendezvous point.176 Due to this loose configuration, LeJ membership is difficult to pinpoint; reports place its numbers at anywhere from under 100 up to 300.177 Even at its inception, as it was carving a name for itself with a long series of sectarian attacks, LeJ’s ranks during the latter 1990s did not exceed 500.178 There are several reasons for the difficulty in estimating LeJ’s numbers. One is the draconian vow that members must take upon joining the group. Amir Rana writes that members are forced to take a vow to the death to carry out the LeJ mission. This includes cutting all ties from family and friends to focus on the cause.179 Additional reports affirm that because of the sectarian rhetoric fomented by mosques and madaris connected to LeJ, there is no shortage of potential members.180 In fact, there is a contending position that the difficulty in measuring the number of LeJ members comes from their dispersion throughout Pakistan and the vetting process through which LeJ militants are selected. According to Amir Mir, LeJ leadership takes great care in recruiting members, looking for both religious conviction and the skill and commitment to carry out attacks. Though one report says that members are entirely invested in the group, Amir Mir reports that after training, the mujahideen are ordered to return to their homes and maintain an inconspicuous appearance and law-abiding lifestyle.181
LeJ seeks to further the SSP goals of marginalizing Shias and turning Pakistan into a Sunni state.182 Pakistani authorities have implicated LeJ in the July 2003 bombing of a Shiite mosque in Karachi, as well as bombings at two other Shiite mosques in Karachi in May and June 2004. However, LeJ has also cast a wider net and has been implicated in attacks on Christian and Western targets throughout Pakistan and in the January 1999 assassination attempt on former prime minister Nawaz Sharif. LeJ members also reportedly used police and security service uniforms to gain access to mosques and for cover after attacks.183 LeJ largely uses suicide bombers on Shia institutions, and it reportedly maintains a recruitment effort to attract young girls to martyrdom by carrying bombs concealed under their burkas or in handbags.184 Some attacks place LeJ in close connection with several other Pakistani militant groups; for example, the murder of American journalist Daniel Pearl involved LeJ along with JeM and LeT.185 There is some uncertainty whether LeJ was involved in the May 2002 attack on French engineers outside a Karachi hotel, or the June 2002 attack on U.S. diplomats. Reports in the days following both attacks note a nebulous al Qaeda network that began to work against Western interests in Karachi. They refer to this group as an amalgam of HuJI, JeM, and LeJ militants; and a previously unknown group, al-Qanoon—believed to be an ad hoc hit squad—claimed responsibility for the latter attack.186
176 Nasr, “Islam, the State and the Rise of Sectarian Militancy in Pakistan,” 99; Mir, The True Face of Jehadis, 179.
177 See U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2004, 209; and South Asia Terrorism Portal, Group Profile, www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/terroristoutfits/lej.htm.
178 Amir Rana, A to Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan, 204.
179 Ibid., 204.
180 South Asia Terrorism Portal, Group Profile, www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/terroristoutfits/lej.htm.
181 Mir, The True Face of Jehadis, 179.
182 MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base.
183 South Asia Terrorism Portal, Group Profile, www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/terroristoutfits/lej.htm.
184 Mir, The True Face of Jehadis, 183.
185 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2004, 103.
186 See Rory McCarthy, “50 Militants Held as Police Hunt Karachi Bombers,” The Guardian (London), May 10, 2002, 13. See also “Bush Condemns ‘Radical Killers,” BBC News, June 14, 2002,
36
LeJ leadership has also been connected with the Taliban through prior relationships in Afghanistan, and it has provided refuge and resources to suspected terrorists after the U.S. invasion. Its leaders were all mujahideen in the campaign against the Soviets and are a product of the same network of Deobandi mosques and madaris that gave rise to the Taliban. Many cadres also have personal connections with members of groups such as HuM and JeM through their mutual beliefs and battlefield experiences. In the past, LeJ militants reportedly trained at Harkat-ul-Mujahideen’s Khalid Bin Waleed camp, and the group maintained a steady supply of weapons from Afghanistan to the Punjab province throughout the 1990s.187
The United States added LeJ to the Foreign Terrorist Organizations list in January 2003.188 As mentioned, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi is reported to have allied with JeM and HuM around 2002 to form what appears to be an al Qaeda-affiliated hit squad. LeJ safe houses were found to hold chemical labs and toxic substances that officials believe were much too sophisticated for LeJ to have been working alone. This led to speculation that the group was receiving assistance from al Qaeda to safeguard its arsenal after the fall of the Taliban.189 Like SSP, LeJ also benefits from the support of other Deobandi groups and wealthy patrons from Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.
An Evolving Jihad?
Although many of the militant groups operating in Pakistan and Kashmir seem to share very similar ideological underpinnings, the differences between the various schools of Islam—in their origins as well as their politics and their attitudes toward minorities—are crucial. Groups following the Ahle Hadith school, for example, strive toward an ideal that is historically incongruent with South Asian Islam. Groups aligned with a given school will recruit members from particular mosques and train them at camps with a specific ideology. Much of the tactical training is necessarily similar due to common battle environments. Mujahideen train in bomb making for urban terrorism, and with light arms and artillery for guerrilla warfare against the Indian army or the Pakistani security services. Jihad and repression may be common narratives in the rhetoric of these groups, but their internal rifts point out the tactical and resource-driven motives that keep many of them at odds.
Nonetheless, an interesting dynamic between some members of these groups has already been observed in several attacks. The assassination of Benazir Bhutto on December 27, 2007, once again drew the attention of analysts and investigators to the connections between Pakistani militant groups and al Qaeda. Members of several groups, including Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Sipah-e-Sahaba, and Jaish-e-Mohammed, reportedly worked with al Qaeda in the attack.190 The danger
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/2044359.stm (accessed July 12, 2006). Regarding the May 2002 bombing, Amir Mir reports that “at least five of the 10 terrorists identified belonged to LeJ cadres.” See Mir, The True Face of Jehadis, 180.
187 South Asia Terrorism Portal, Group Profile, www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/terroristoutfits/lej.htm; Amir Rana, A to Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan, 204.
188 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2005, 208.
189 MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base.
190 “U.S. Suspects Taliban Leader behind Bhutto Plot,” CNN, December 29, 2007, http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/asiapcf/12/28/bhutto.dhs.alqaeda/. See also Carlotta Gall, “Local Militants in 37
posed by the Pakistani groups is widely known, but the degree to which al Qaeda is entrenched in the militant terrain of Pakistan remains an important empirical question. The jihadi groups operating within the country have apparently become more nebulous, and the same confusion now surrounds how they support al Qaeda’s jihadi goals, or whether they even support them at all. Depending on the reports one reads, those culpable in recent attacks range from the usual suspects—or at least the same groups in their reconstituted forms—to little-known groups that appear to crop up out of nowhere. Alliances and “hit squads” appear to be a reaction to increased pressures from the Musharraf regime. For example, Lashkar-e-Omar is a recent alliance of members from HuJI, LeJ and, JeM appeared on analysts’ radars after the January 2002 ban of those groups.191
The national security establishments in both the United States and Pakistan have warned of a resurgent core of al Qaeda leadership operating in Pakistan’s tribal areas and in its cities, especially Karachi.192 It is believed that the rise in suicide attacks in Pakistan points to an increased affinity for al Qaeda’s methods, if not to direct collusion with the group itself. After the October 18 and December 27, 2007, suicide attacks on former prime minister Benazir Bhutto, one news outlet claimed that “today no other country on earth is arguably more dangerous than Pakistan.” Pakistan’s ungoverned spaces in the tribal areas, its political instability, and its history of well-supported Islamist militant networks are a witch’s brew that allow the likes of Osama bin Laden to thrive.193 While al Qaeda may be able to regroup in the accommodating tribal territories, the formal organizational links between al Qaeda and the jihadi groups in Pakistan cannot be ignored but they should also not be hastily assumed.
The militant groups operating in Pakistan and Kashmir cannot be lumped into one monolithic movement, nor can they be conflated with the broader global Salafi jihad simply because some members of certain groups have aided and abetted al Qaeda. In fact, Mariam Abou Zahab and Olivier Roy point out that after the Afghan jihad, al Qaeda and the Pakistani groups emerged as two prominent international movements that remained distinct from one another. Once the Taliban and al Qaeda established formal links in the early 1990s, the latter group came to control the non-Pakistani militants, including the notorious Arab-Afghans, and Deobandi groups came to control the Pakistani militants.194 The history of foreign militants in Afghanistan and Pakistan is well trodden, but this initial distinction between local jihadis and foreigners laid a foundation that is still important to the current jihadi terrain in Pakistan. The Arab-Afghans tended to view their local allies as inferior in both faith and custom, believing their rural practice of Islam to be impure and backward. While some of the Arab-Afghans stayed behind and married locally, the majority of foreign fighters did not learn the language or integrate with the population. Therefore, despite alliances with the Taliban and their progeny in the tribal areas, the leadership of the remaining al Qaeda core appears to be strictly foreign.
Pakistan Add to Qaeda Threat,” New York Times, December 30, 2007, A1, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/30/world/asia/30pakistan.html.
191 Swami, “Terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir,” 58, table 1.
192 Spenser Hsu and Walter Pincus, “U.S. Warns of Stronger Al-Qaeda,” Washington Post, July 12, 2007, A01.
193 Ron Moreau and Michael Hirsh, “Where the Jihad Lives Now,” Newsweek, October 29, 2007, 28.
194 Mariam Abou Zahab and Olivier Roy, Islamist Networks: The Afghan-Pakistan Connection (London: Hurst, 2002), 47-48.
38
Furthermore, while Pakistanis such as Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Mohammad Naeem Noor Khan, Ramzi Yousef, and Fazlur Rehman Khalil have been linked to al Qaeda and the global jihad (Khalil, as mentioned, being a signatory of Osama bin Laden’s 1998 Declaration of the World Islamic Front Against the Jews and Crusaders), there is scant open-source information on formal connections between the jihadi groups in Pakistan and al Qaeda. That the militant groups of Pakistan provide al Qaeda cadres with shelter and resources is known. However, with increased pressure from the Pakistani government and the international community, the question remains whether it is in these groups’ best interest to continue this support on an organizational level. Instead, like the relationships forged during the Afghan jihad, these connections appear to be born of convenience and personal relationships. The occasional statements of groups such as the Islambouli Brigade of al Qaeda—which claimed responsibility for the 2004 suicide attack on the convoy of former prime minister Shaukat Aziz—and any apparent involvement of al Qaeda in the assassination attempts on Pervez Musharraf, seem to mean that rogue elements from Pakistan’s militant networks are colluding with a more transnational jihadi movement. In other words, while these individuals may appear on the domestic militant front at one time or another, they could very well have grown tired of their parent group’s cooperation with the Pakistani regime (and by extension the United States) and splintered into an ad hoc alliance. According to Miriam Abou Zahab and Olivier Roy, “the transnational links between the Pakistani Islamists, the Taliban and al Qaida do not appear to have an organizational base. In reality everything rests on personal connections, the connection of the madrasas, chance meetings in training camps and community of interests.”195 Some believe that there may be no such thing as a “Pakistani al Qaeda” and that any apparent links between Pakistan’s jihadi groups and al Qaeda are decentralized and diffuse.196
This does not detract from the danger that these personal connections portend, because certain elements of Pakistani society are hospitable to an outbreak of far-reaching violence. While a recent poll suggests that many Pakistanis are growing frustrated with al Qaeda and militant groups, the question remains, what, then, are the elements that contribute to this jihadi nexus in Pakistan? Groups can either control mosques—usually through their parent organizations such as JUI, SSP, or JI—or maintain ties with loyal constituents at particular mosques. In these cases, the groups are able to recruit through mosque-goers or sympathetic imams. Imams may also approach parents and request that they send their children for religious education. Whether it is through the mosque or the madrassa, the groups winnow down groups of students or members with more topical discussions as a manner of narrowing the potential recruitment pool.197
Recently, the impact of madrassa education on militant recruitment has come under scrutiny. Although the madaris have often been called “conveyor belts of terrorism,” experts now believe this label to be an exaggeration and a misrepresentation of the madaris and their place in Pakistani society. First, even the estimates on the number of madaris are woefully inaccurate. Second, the role of the madaris in military-type training has not been adequately explored. Some experts believe they provide little to none of the essential hands-on training, and recent studies cast into doubt the role of these schools as a primary source of manpower for jihad. For example, a recent study found that less than one percent of students in Pakistan are enrolled in madaris
195 Ibid., 58.
196 Ibid, 66; Abbas, “The Pakistani Al-Qaeda,” 57.
197 Fair, “Militant Recruitment in Pakistan,” 494. 39
full-time. Similarly, according to Christine Fair, “most observers believe that only a very small number of madaris are involved in the actual training of militants.198
If not the madaris, what about public educational institutions? Several experts have recently emphasized that these institutions provide important recruiting grounds for militant groups. For one thing, curricula that involve revisionist history and emphasize Muslim victimhood can stoke the flames of hatred just as effectively as any madrassa education. Second, with better access to communication technology and within the atmosphere of activist campus movements, students in public institutions have the ability to access and disseminate vitriolic propaganda more readily than do madrassa students. Finally, many students in public institutions study highly specialized fields, such as information technology, engineering, and the physical sciences—curricula that are much more useful to militant groups than rote memorization of the Quran.199 Thus, while overt public support for militant movements may be on the wane, there seems to be a nexus between the appeal of radical causes for educated individuals and the demand for trained members in jihadi groups.
This is not to exonerate the madaris as potential breeding grounds for militant ideology, but their role in the recruitment of militants is misunderstood and perhaps overstated. There is evidence that the density of madaris may contribute to a surge in sectarian violence, perhaps due to each school’s coalescence around a particular brand of Islam. There have been reports that in some madaris up to thirty percent of enrolled students come from middle-class families. It is presumed that these families would have other education options for their children, so the education of children from poor families is not the sole role that madaris play. There is also a demand-side component because of the prestige attached to an Islamic education for at least one child per family. An increased dismay with government institutions no doubt also turns some families toward madaris. For the most part, however, it is believed that the madrassa system in its current form may not even be equipped to produce a religious elite that is relevant to a modern Muslim state.200 Instead, the madaris along with public institutions create a sort of radical milieu that adds to the popular support for jihadist groups. Moreover, many places in Pakistan allow for a grassroots recruitment process rooted in the camaraderie fostered in any one of Pakistan’s military campaigns.201
Thus, further research questions are ripe for pursuing. For one, the definitive link between al Qaeda and Pakistani groups is always assumed to be apparent but doubt lingers as to the extent of this relationship. Also, the increasing number of reports highlighting the importance of training camps in Pakistan and Afghanistan requires further exploration—particularly the connections between these camps and youths in Western countries such as the United Kingdom—to assess the concrete links in Pakistan (if any) to a concerted, global jihad. What are the channels of communication between potential militants or terrorists, and their hosts in Pakistan? Do interlocutors or mosques in the West have explicit ties to any specific jihadi group
198 See Fair, “Islamic Education in Pakistan.”
199 See Peter Bergen and Swati Pandey, “The Madrassa Scapegoat,” Washington Quarterly 29, no. 2 (Spring 2006): 117-125; Alexander Evans, “Understanding Madrasahs,” Foreign Affairs 85, no. 1 (January-February 2006); Fair, “Militant Recruitment in Pakistan,” 494.
200 Fair, “Islamic Education in Pakistan.”
201 Ibid.; Fair, “Militant Recruitment in Pakistan,” 494.
40
41
in Pakistan, or are they simply an initial filter? Many of the problems that Pakistan faces, on issues from militancy to national identity to the erosion of democratic governance, are inextricably linked. While Pakistan’s role in global Islamist militancy is widely asserted, the uncertainties presented here are simply a launching point for the study of these groups and the role Pakistan plays in Islamist militancy. Therefore, the solution of jailing or assassinating jihadi leaders is unlikely to be effective in such a multifaceted dilemma. Rather, sound policy requires an understanding of the histories, tactics, and underlying motivations of these jihadi movements in Pakistan.